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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
TOMAS R. HERRERA, : Case No. 920209 
Defendant/Appellant, : 
and : 
MIKELL SWEEZEY, : Case No. 920209 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 11 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
State v. Herreraf Case No. 920209 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(h) (1992). This Court entered a minute entry granting 
Defendant's petition for interlocutory review. A copy of the minute 
entry is contained in Addendum A. 
State v. Sweezey, Case No. 920265 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(b). On June 2, 1992, the Court of Appeals certified the 
petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal to this 
Court. See Addendum B. 
On August 4, 1992, this Court issued its order granting 
interlocutory appeal in Sweezey and consolidating Sweezey and 
Herrera for calendaring and oral argument. See Addendum C. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following statutes and constitutional 
provisions is contained in Addendum D. 
Article I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah; 
Article I, Section 9, Constitution of Utah; 
Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah; 
Article I, Section 24, Constitution of Utah; 
Amendment V, Constitution of the United States; 
Amendment VIII, Constitution of the United States; 
Amendment XIVf Constitution of the United States; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1991); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4 (1953 as amended); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103 (1953 as amended); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104 (1953 as amended); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203 (1953 as amended); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-204 (1953 as amended). 
The text of former Utah statutes providing for a defense of 
insanity are contained in Addendum E. Those former statutes are: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1973); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-41 (1953); 
Revised Statutes § 103-1-40 (1933); 
Utah Penal Code § 7915 (4071) (1917); 
Title I, § 4387, Compiled Laws of Utah (1888); 
Title I, Chapter 1852, § 22, Compiled Laws of 
Territory of Utah (1876). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does Utah's statutory scheme which allows a defense of 
insanity only where insanity negates the mens rea violate federal 
due process because defendants who are not morally culpable for 
their acts are nevertheless held legally culpable? 
2. Does Utah's statutory scheme violate state due process 
by holding insane individuals who do not know the difference between 
right and wrong or who are not capable of controlling their conduct 
culpable for their conduct? 
3. Does Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 violate federal or state 
due process by relieving the State of its burden to prove each 
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt? 
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4. Does Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 violate state or federal 
due process or equal protection because the distinctions between 
insane offenders created by the statutory scheme are arbitrary and 
capricious, and result in differential treatment for similarly 
situated individuals? 
5. Does the treatment, trial and potential criminal 
punishment of an insane individual violate the eighth amendment 
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment or Article I# 
Section 9 of the Utah constitution? 
6. Does the requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4 that 
an insane individual who intends to attempt to negate the mens rea 
subject himself to examination violate either the federal or state 
protection against giving evidence against oneself? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues presented in this case are issues of first 
impression in this state and involve questions of law. They are 
subject to a de novo review by this Court, applying a correction of 
error standard of review. See generally State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774 (Utah 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
State v. Herrera, Case No. 920209 
In an Information dated June 9, 1991, the State charged 
Mr. Herrera with one count of Criminal Homicide, a first degree 
felony, and two counts of Attempted Criminal Homicide, Murder, 
second degree felonies. RH. 007-9.* 
1. Footnote on next page. 
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On August 19, 1991, Appellant Herrera filed his "Motion to 
Declare Utah Statutory Scheme Unconstitutional." RH. 26-29. A copy 
of this motion is contained in Addendum F. Appellant Herrera also 
filed an Amended Plea which indicated that he was pleading "not 
guilty or in the alternative not guilty by reason of insanity" 
(RH. 157) and an Affidavit from Dr. Breck Lebegue (RH. 159-61). 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the submission of memoranda, and 
argument, the trial judge denied the motion. RH. 85-135, 45-9, 
50-3, 162. The State prepared Findings of Facts and Conclusions of 
Law. RH. 204-21. See Addendum G. 
Following argument as to the appropriateness of the State's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial judge signed such 
Findings and Conclusions on April 3, 1992. RH. 244. On May 13, 
1992, this Court granted Mr. Herrera's petition for interlocutory 
review of the trial judge's denial of his "Motion to Declare Utah 
Statutory Scheme in Regards to Mentally 111 Offenders 
Unconstitutional." See Addendum A. 
Appellant Herrera is incarcerated. 
State v. Sweezey, Case No. 920265 
In an Information dated November 19, 1991, the State 
charged Mikell Sweezey with one count of Attempted Criminal 
Homicide, Murder, a second degree felony.2 RS. 7. On March 5, 
1. Citations to the record in State v. Herrera, Case No. 920209, 
appear as "RH" throughout this brief. Citations to the record in 
State v. Sweezey, Case No. 920265, appear as "RS." 
2. The probable cause statement alleges that Appellant walked up to 
an individual who was standing outside the Marriott Hotel, shot the 
individual and stated "[t]hey wrecked my home so I shot him." RS. 8. 
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1992, Appellant Sweezey filed his "Motion to Declare Utah Statutory 
Scheme in Regards to Mentally 111 Offenders Unconstitutional" 
(RS. 27-31), "Motion to Declare 77-14-4 Unconstitutional" 
(RS. 36-8), "Notice of Intent to Contest an Element of the Offense" 
(RS. 32), an "Amended Plea" of not guilty or not guilty by reason of 
insanity (RS. 34-6), an affidavit from Dr. Breck Lebegue 
(RS. 91-102), and accompanying memorandum (RS. 39-90). See 
Addendum F for copy of motion. In his motion and memorandum, 
Appellant Sweezey raised the same issues raised by Appellant Herrera 
regarding the constitutionality of Utah's insanity defense. 
In an order dated April 20, 1992, Judge Murphy denied 
Appellant's motions. RS. 217-18. A copy of the ruling is contained 
in Addendum G. 
On August 4, 1992, this Court granted Appellant Sweezey's 
petition for interlocutory review. See Addendum C. 
Appellant Sweezey is incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
State v. Herrera# Case No. 920209 
Dr. Breck Lebegue, a recognized expert in forensic 
psychiatry, performed psychological tests and evaluations on 
Defendant/Appellant Tomas Herrera. RH. 160. Based on his 
evaluations of Mr. Herrera, Dr. Lebegue holds the opinion that 
Appellant suffered from mental illness at the time of the offense in 
the instant case and "would qualify for an affirmative defense of 
insanity as that defense existed in Utah prior to 1983."3 RH. 160. 
3. Footnote on next page. 
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At the time of the hearings in the trial court on the 
issues raised herein, Dr. Lebegue was "unable to state with 
certainty whether Tomas Herrera would qualify for the defense of 
insanity as presently defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1990 
Repl. Vol.)."4 RH. 160. 
Although the State initially argued that Appellant lacked 
standing to raise these issues, it ultimately conceded the standing 
issue. RH. 453.5 
3. Prior to 1983, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 provided in 
pertinent part: 
Mental disease or defect. - (1) In any 
prosecution for an offense, it shall be a defense 
that the defendant, at the time of the proscribed 
conduct, as the result of mental disease or 
defect, lacked substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of this conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law. 
4. The current version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 allows the use 
of mental illness as a defense only where that mental illness 
negates the requisite mental state. It provides in pertinent part: 
Mental Illness - Use as a Defense - Influence of 
alcohol or other substance voluntarily consume -
Definition. 
(1) It is a defense to a prosecution 
under any statute or ordinance that the 
defendant, as a result of mental illness, 
lacked the mental state required as an 
element of the offense charged. Mental 
illness is not otherwise a defense. 
5. It should be noted that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law signed by the judge in the Herrera case were created completely 
by the State. The State initially argued that Appellant Herrera 
lacked standing to raise the issues herein. RH. 286, 351-2. Prior 
to the trial judge's ruling from the bench, the State had conceded 
that Appellant Herrera had "limited" standing but continued to 
maintain that he was precluded from raising certain issues. 
RH. 409, 417-18. 
The trial judge then ruled on the record, without taking 
the matter under advisement, that he would deny Appellant's motions 
"for the reasons as are set forth by [the State's attorney], so that 
(continued) 
- fi 
(footnote 5 continued) 
this case can be moved along." RH. 429. Defense counsel was under 
the impression that the motions were denied based on a lack of 
standing. RH. 277, 453. The State then prepared seventeen pages of 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which had not been 
articulated by the Court. RH. 204-21. The standing issue did not 
appear in the Findings and Conclusions. These "Findings" addressed 
the merits of the argument, with the only limitation on standing 
being that Appellant did not have standing to challenge the 
manslaughter or guilty and mentally ill statutes. RH. 215. The 
trial judge had never mentioned these specific limitations. 
During the protracted argument over the propriety of the 
Findings and Conclusions, the State indicated that Defendant had 
standing to raise the issues herein. RH. 453. Defense counsel 
traced the history of the preparation of the Findings and 
Conclusions, pointing out the confusion which had arisen because the 
State created Findings and Conclusions which had not been made by 
the judge. RH. 453-6. 
As appellate courts in this state give greater weight to 
the findings of trial judges, it is becoming increasingly more 
important to distinguish between findings which were actually made 
by the judge and those which were determined by counsel for the 
winning side. 
Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion in Automatic Control 
Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc.y 780 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1989), which is 
cited with approval by this Court in the unanimous State v. 
Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990), indicates that 
the trial courts must articulate the bases for their rulings, and 
that they must closely scrutinize findings drafted by counsel. 
Automatic Control at 1263-4. The opinion further indicates that 
reviewing courts pay counsel-drafted findings less deference than 
those drafted by judges. Id. In Automatic Control Prods. Corp., 
Justice Zimmerman stated: 
The findings of fact "is an important part 
of the judicial function,11 one that is designed 
to flesh out the rationale for the decision and 
one that "the judge cannot surrender . . . to 
counsel." As the United States Supreme Court has 
noted, findings of fact prepared by the court are 
"drawn with the insight of a disinterested mind" 
and are "more helpful to the appellate court" 
than those prepared by counsel. It is for this 
reason that the federal courts appear to have 
almost uniformly adopted the rule that while 
findings prepared by counsel are sufficient under 
the federal analogue to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52, appellate courts "will feel freer 
in close cases to disregard a finding or remand 
for further findings if the trial court did not 
prepare them him [or her] self." 
(continued) 
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Dr. Lebegue also testified the most common diagnosis for 
mentally ill offenders is schizophrenia, a psychotic illness wherein 
the individual suffers from delusions. RH. 310-11, 313. He 
delineated the two categories of such offenders and indicated that 
the majority of mentally ill offenders, although compelled to kill 
by a delusional system and seriously mentally ill, do not qualify 
for an insanity defense under Utah's current statute. RH. 313-18. 
His testimony was similar to the information in his affidavit filed 
(footnote 5 continued) 
I know that I apply a similar standard in 
reviewing findings prepared by counsel, and I 
suspect that other members of the Court do the 
same, although to my knowledge, we have never 
said so. In light of this fact and the rule 
stated above, trial courts would be well advised 
to be vigilant in guarding against the tendency 
to view findings as a detail to be dealt with as 
expeditiously as possible, rather than as a 
fundamental part of the decisional process, one 
that goes to the heart of its integrity. In the 
same vein, counsel preparing proposed findings 
and conclusions should be cautious lest in their 
zeal, they inc[l]ude proposals that may undermine 
the integrity of the judgment they hope to obtain. 
Id. at 1263-1264 (citations omitted). See also United States v. 
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964). 
Although the issues before this Court involve questions of 
law which should be reviewed de novo for correctness, to the extent 
that any factual issues arise during this Court's review, Appellant 
Herrera respectfully requests that this Court not give deference to 
any relevant findings. 
For instance, the State's drafted finding that the 
"affidavit of Reuben Martinez" contains "merely common 
generalizations of a lay witness" and that the Court "gives no 
credence to them" is irrelevant since the State conceded standing. 
RH. 238. In addition, it arguably conflicts with this Court's 
decision in State v. Melleny 583 P.2d 46 (Utah 1978), which 
recognizes that testimony of lay witnesses is admissible in certain 
circumstances to establish insanity. Should this finding assume 
importance, this Court should not give it deference, despite the 
trial judge's later affirmation of this finding. 
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in the Sweezey case. That information is set forth more fully in 
the Sweezey section of this fact statement. A copy of the affidavit 
prepared by Dr. Lebegue in each case is contained in Addendum H. 
State v. Sweezey, Case No. 920265 
Dr. Breck Lebegue also performed psychological tests and 
evaluations on Appellant Mikell Sweezey. Dr. Lebegue prepared an 
affidavit which was submitted in the trial court and is contained in 
Addendum H. 
In his affidavit, Dr. Lebegue provided information similar 
to his testimony in Herrera. He indicated that the majority of the 
offenders he has evaluated have been diagnosed as paranoid 
schizophrenics who suffered from delusions. RS. 92. The delusional 
offenders fall into two categories: (1) those whose delusions cause 
them to commit the act and who know they are harming a person, 
"although the delusions distort the actual people involved, or the 
real situation" (RS. 92); and (2) those whose delusions cause them 
to commit the act but who "have the delusional belief they are 
harming or killing something that is not human" (RS. 92). 
Dr. Lebegue further indicated: 
Neither group of offenders is more mentally ill 
than the other; both groups are equally in need 
of treatment; the delusions seem equally real for 
both groups of offenders; each group has the same 
inability to comprehend the wrongfulness of their 
acts; each group is equally unable to control 
their behavior; the threat of punishment will 
deter neither group from acting in accordance 
with their delusions. 
RS. 93. "Under current Utah law, only the second category of 
mentally ill offenders [those that did not know they were harming 
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something human] qualifies for a defense of insanity, even though 
the only difference between the two groups is the content of their 
delusions which are caused by their mental illness." RS. 93. 
Mikell Sweezey suffered from mental illness at the time of 
the act, and "there are legitimate issues as to defendant's sanity 
at the time of the commission of the offense." RS. 94. While 
Mikell Sweezey would qualify for an insanity defense under the 
pre-1983 law, he does not qualify for such a defense under the 
current law. RS. 94. 
The State conceded that Mikell Sweezey had standing to 
raise the issues addressed herein. RS. 357-8, 375. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Federal due process requires that a defense of mental 
nonresponsibility be available to persons who, as the result of 
mental illness, do not understand the wrongfulness of their 
actions. Such a defense was firmly entrenched in English common law 
at the time the federal constitution was adopted and has been 
allowed, and continues to be allowed, by a majority of the states. 
Fundamental fairness requires that persons who, because of mental 
illness, are unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of their acts not 
be held criminally culpable. Utah's statutory scheme does not allow 
such an insanity defense and allows mental illness to be used as a 
defense only in rare cases where the mental illness negates the 
intent requirement. Insanity and mens rea are distinct concepts, 
and the removal of a defense of insanity violates federal due 
process. 
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State due process mandates an insanity defense which, at 
the very least, requires that persons who are unable to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of their actions or to control their conduct due to 
mental illness not be held criminally culpable. Throughout Utah's 
history as a territory and state (until the 1983 statutory change), 
there has been heightened awareness of the need for humane treatment 
of mentally ill persons and broad application of an insanity defense 
for conduct which would otherwise be criminal. Prior to the 
adoption of the Utah constitution, M'Naghten's rule and something 
similar to the "irresistible impulse" test were being followed in 
Utah. Following statehood, this state clearly adopted such a 
combination test. 
This broad test for insanity was followed until 1973 when 
the even broader A.L.I. Model Penal Code test was adopted. A review 
of this state's history, case law from this state interpreting the 
due process clause of the state constitution, and case law from 
other jurisdictions demonstrates that the Utah constitution requires 
such a defense. 
Assuming, arguendo, that due process does not mandate an 
insanity defense as set forth in Points I and II, Utah's statutory 
scheme nevertheless violates federal and state due process by 
relieving the state of its burden to prove each element of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Utah's statutory scheme is arbitrary and capricious, in 
violation of state and federal due process and equal protection in 
that it treats mentally ill offenders who suffer from the same type 
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and severity of mental illness based on the content of their 
delusions. Although such persons are not able to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of their conduct, Utah law makes an arbitrary 
distinction based on the form and nature of the delusion. 
Utah's statutory scheme violates state and federal 
proscriptions against cruel and unusual punishment in that it finds 
persons criminally culpable and punishes such persons despite the 
inability of such mentally ill persons to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of their conduct. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Utah's statutory scheme is not 
otherwise unconstitutional, the requirement that an individual who 
desires to attempt to negate the mens rea requirement by asserting a 
defense of insanity make himself available for evaluation violates 
state and federal protections against being required to give 
evidence against oneself. Where a defendant can only use mental 
state to negate an element, such a requirement is unconstitutional. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. UTAH'S STATUTORY SCHEME VIOLATES 
FEDERAL DUE PROCESS. 
A. THE ELIMINATION OF AN INDEPENDENT DEFENSE OF 
INSANITY IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 VIOLATES 
FEDERAL DUE PROCESS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1991 Repl. Vol.) provides in 
pertinent part: 
(1) It is a defense to a prosecution under any 
statute or ordinance that the defendant, as the 
result of mental illness, lacked the mental state 
required as an element of the offense charged. 
Mental illness is not otherwise a defense. 
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Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305, a criminal defendant 
can rely on evidence of mental illness to negate the mens rea 
requirement. A criminal defendant cannot, however, rely on insanity 
as a basis for nonresponsibility for the crime unless he suffers 
from a form of insanity which serves to negate the mens rea element 
of the crime. Since a criminal defendant always has the opportunity 
to negate the mens rea element of a crime and the State is required 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of a crime, the 
current version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 does not provide a 
criminal defendant with an affirmative insanity defense. Instead, 
the statute codifies the due process requirement that the State 
prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt in the 
mental illness context. See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Hence, in Utah, the 
traditional affirmative defense of insanity has been abolished.6 
6. Prior to 1983, Utah always provided a mental nonresponsibility 
defense which absolved a defendant of culpability. The definition 
of insanity has evolved and become broader over time as scientific 
knowledge has progressed. The most recent formulation in Utah prior 
to 1983 provided a defense of mental nonresponsibility to a criminal 
defendant who did not have a substantial capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law. See footnote 3, supra, at 6. 
The significant difference between the pre-1983 and 
post-1983 versions of the statute is apparent from the following 
example. A criminal defendant who kills another person because he 
believes he is squeezing a grapefruit qualifies for the defense 
under either version. Under the current version, such a defense, if 
believed, would negate the mens rea; under the pre-1983 version, 
such a defendant would be unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of 
his conduct. 
A criminal defendant who kills another individual because 
he suffers delusions and believes that he is in a war, and that 
person is the enemy, does not qualify under the current version of 
(continued) 
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Utah, Idaho and Montana are the only states which have 
abolished the affirmative defense of insanity and, instead, allow a 
mentally ill defendant to be absolved of culpability only where he 
can negate the mental state.7 In a strongly worded analysis, the 
American Bar Association (ABA) has condemned the "mens rea 
limitation" statutes which have been enacted in Utah, Idaho and 
Montana. A.B.A. Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, Part VI, 
Nonresponsibility for Crime at 336-8. 
This approach, which would permit evidence of 
mental condition bearing on the requisite mental 
or culpability element of the crime but eliminate 
mental nonresponsibility [insanity] as an 
independent, exculpatory doctrine, was considered 
for a time by Congress and was adopted in Idaho, 
Montana, and Utah. The ABA has rejected it out 
of hand. Such a jarring reversal of hundreds of 
years of moral and legal history would constitute 
an unfortunate and unwarranted overreaction to 
the problems typified by the Hinckley verdict.8 
(footnote 6 continued) 
the statute. Such a person would have the requisite mens rea since 
he knew he was killing a person, and knew the consequence of his 
actions. Such a criminal defendant would, however, qualify under 
the pre-1983 version since he could not appreciate the wrongfulness 
of his conduct. 
7. Of these three states, the Utah statute is the most 
restrictive. Both Montana and Idaho provide the accused protection 
during the sentencing phase. See Montana Code § 46-14-311; Idaho 
Code § 19-2523. By contrast, although Utah's statutory scheme 
provides for hospitalization of certain mentally ill offenders who 
are still mentally ill at the time of sentencing, it does not 
require the sentencing judge to inquire into whether the defendant 
could "appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct" or "conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the offense 
charged." See Montana Code § 46-14-311. 
8. A jury found John Hinckley not guilty by reason of insanity for 
an attempted assassination of then President Reagan. The verdict 
"resulted in a new round of controversy over the defense rivaling 
the M'Naghten experience." ABA Standards at 324. 
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Id. at 336-7 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
The issue presented in this part is whether a defense of 
mental nonresponsibility which absolves an insane defendant of 
culpability where he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of 
his actions is fundamental to notions of fairness, decency and 
justice so as to be incorporated in the concept of federal due 
process. 
In determining whether a particular concept or practice is 
protected by federal due process, courts look to whether the 
practice is 
consistent with the fundamental principles of 
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all 
our civil and political institutions and not 
infrequently are designated as "law of the land." 
State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 927 (Idaho 1990) (McDevitt, J., 
dissenting), citing Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316-7, 47 
S. Ct. 103, 104, 71 L.Ed. 270 (1926). Those aspects of the Bill of 
Rights which are applicable to the states through the fourteenth 
amendment due process clause are rights that "have been found to be 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" so that a "fair and 
enlightened system of justice would be impossible without them." 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-5, 58 S. Ct. 149, 151-2, 82 
L.Ed.2d 288 (1937). 
Due process has also been described as "principle[s] of 
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as 
to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 
105, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934). See also Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 1447, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 
(1968) (due process protects rights which are "fundamental to the 
American scheme of justice); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 
413-4, 65 S. Ct. 781, 787, 89 L.Ed. 1029 (1945) (concepts of due 
process arises from a historical perspective, reflect "a demand for 
civilized standard of law," and reflect notions of fairness, justice 
and decency). 
The United States Supreme Court has never directly 
addressed the issue of whether federal due process requires that a 
defense of insanity, other than the ability to negate the mens rea 
requirement, exist. 
In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S. Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 
1302 (1952), the Court rejected the defendant's claim that Oregon's 
"adoption of the 'right and wrong' test of legal insanity in 
preference to the 'irresistible impulse' test" violated due process. 
The Leland Court pointed out that although the science of psychiatry 
had evolved since M'Naghten's case, "the progress of science has not 
reached a point where its learning would compel us to require the 
states to eliminate the right and wrong test [in favor of the 
irresistible impulse test]." The Court concluded that given the 
current state of the science of psychiatry, the historical 
perspective, and the fact that the majority of states followed a 
right and wrong test, the "irresistible impulse test is not 
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Id. at 801. 
Implicit, however, in the Leland majority decision is the notion 
that insane defendants are not culpable for their conduct. See also 
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. at 802-07 (Justice Frankfurter, joined by 
Justice Black, dissenting) (analysis in dissent based on assumption 
that insane persons are not criminally culpable). 
In State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 923 (McDevitt, J., 
dissenting), Justice McDevitt pointed out that he did "not believe 
that the holding in Leiand leads to the conclusion that the insanity 
defense is not contained within the concept of due process." 
Searcy, 798 P.2d at 923. 
Thus, the Leland decision is properly read to 
hold that no one test of insanity has been proven 
so scientifically reliable as to amount to a 
constitutional prohibition of the use of any 
other test by the mandates of due process. 
Instead, the Supreme Court in Leland recognizes 
that the science of psychiatry is not yet so 
accurate that it has the capacity to formulate a 
standard that will accurately quantify mental 
responsibility in all individual cases. 
Id. 
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254, 88 S. Ct. 2145 
(1968), also did not clarify whether an insanity defense is 
constitutionally mandated. In reaching its decision that punishing 
chronic alcoholics for being drunk in a public place was not cruel 
and unusual, the plurality opinion stated: 
We cannot cast aside the centuries-long evolution 
of the collection of interlocking and overlapping 
concepts which the common law has utilized to 
assess the moral accountability of an individual 
for his antisocial deeds. The doctrines of 
actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, 
justification, and duress have historically 
provided the tools for a constantly shifting 
adjustment of the tension between the evolving 
aims of the criminal law and changing religious, 
moral, philosophical and medical views of the 
nature of man. The process of adjustment has 
always been thought to be province of the States. 
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Powell, 392 U.S. at 353. 
The decision in Powell evidenced a reluctance to "adopt one 
magic phrase to encompass all issues of moral accountability" and a 
recognition that the concepts of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, 
mistake, justification, and duress have changed and evolved over the 
years. Searcy, 798 P.2d at 926. Although the precise definitions 
change, the idea that these concepts are part of due process has 
not. The dissent in State v. Searcy pointed out: 
. . . I cannot accept the majority's reading of 
[Powell v. Texas] as an implicit rejection of the 
insanity defense as a doctrine rooted in the 
constitution. Indeed, the Supreme Court's 
enumeration of the insanity defense in the 
cherished and distinguished company of the 
doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, mistake, 
justification, and duress lends force to the 
argument that insanity is on equal par with those 
concepts within the constitution. Although 
Powell leaves the process of the adjustment of 
the tension between those concepts to the states, 
it certainly does not imply that the states may 
constitutionally abolish each, or any, of those 
doctrines without running afoul of the 
constitution. 
Id. at 926. 
Although the Court has not directly addressed the issue, 
two United States Supreme Court cases suggest that a criminal 
defendant must be "blameworthy" in order to be held criminally 
responsible. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S. Ct. 
8417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 
S. Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957). 
Three older decisions from state supreme courts indicate 
that a separate defense of insanity is constitutionally mandated. 
See State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 102 (1970); Sinclair v. 
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State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So.2d 581 (1931); State v. Lanqef 168 La. 
958, 123 So. 639 (1929). 
In Sinclair v. State, the court explicitly referred to the 
type of insanity not covered by the current Utah statute and 
concluded that disallowing a defense where an individual suffers 
from such a type of insanity would be unconstitutional. 
A monomaniac may kill a man under the insane 
delusion that the man is an enemy who is about to 
kill him. Here there is an intent, as the 
monomaniac clearly understands that the act will 
result in the victim's death; but there is a lack 
of animus, because he believes that he is 
justified, and that the act, therefore, is right 
in the sight of the law. It is clear, then, that 
where the mind of the perpetrator is so diseased 
as to exclude the presence of an intent or animus 
in the commission of the crime in question, he 
should not be punished as criminal. So closely 
has the idea of insanity as a defense to crime 
been woven into the criminal jurisprudence of 
English speaking countries that it has become 
part of the fundamental laws thereof, to the 
extent that a statute which attempts to deprive a 
defendant of the right to plead it will be 
unconstitutional and void. 
Sinclair, 132 So. at 584. 
In State v. Strasburg, the court reasoned that a defendant 
who was deprived of his opportunity to show that he was insane and 
did not understand the nature and quality of his acts was deprived 
of his right to due process and a trial by jury in the same way as 
if he were precluded from showing that he did not commit the act. 
In its analysis, the court made no distinction between persons 
suffering from mental illness which negated mens rea and those 
suffering from insanity who nevertheless possessed the requisite 
mens rea. 
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We believe enough has been said to show that the 
sanity of the accused at the time of committing 
the act charged against him has always been 
regarded as much as substantive fact, going to 
make up his guilt, as the fact of his physical 
commission of the act. 
110 P. at 1022. See also State v. Lanqe, 123 So. 639. 
In State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992 (Mont. 1984), the court 
attempted to distinguish Sinclair, Strasburg and Lanqe by stating: 
These decisions are distinguishable in that they 
interpret statutes that precluded any trial 
testimony of mental condition, including that 
which would cast doubt on the defendant's state 
of mind at the time he committed the charged 
offense. The Montana statutes in question 
expressly allow evidence of mental disease or 
defect to be introduced to rebut proof of 
defendant's state of mind. 
Korell, 690 P.2d at 1000. 
The distinction made by the Montana court is not persuasive 
in reviewing the Utah statute since the Utah statute does preclude 
evidence of a defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense. 
For example, the Utah statute would preclude evidence that, as the 
result of delusions, the defendant thought he was shooting the enemy 
during a war. This example was expressly articulated by the 
Sinclair court in its analysis of why the statute at issue was 
unconstitutional. 
In Korell and State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914 (Idaho 1990), 
the defendants attacked the Idaho and Montana statutes which allow a 
defendant to present evidence of insanity only to the extent that it 
negates mens rea. Although the decisions in those cases upholding 
the Idaho and Montana statutes are not controlling in this state, it 
should also be noted that those decisions fail to recognize that a 
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form of insanity exists which affects mental state at the time of 
the crime but which does not negate intent, e.g., the situation 
where an individual knows that he is killing a human being but does 
so under a delusion that the person is a war enemy. Instead, both 
Searcy and Korell blur the distinction between insanity and intent, 
recognizing only that form of insanity which negates the intent to 
do the crime. 
The decision in Searcy has been criticized by at least one 
commentator for its failure "to articulate the relationship between 
mens rea and mental illness" and its failure to address the 
decisions in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, and Fisher v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 463. See Recent Developments, Due Process— 
Insanity Defense—Idaho Supreme Court Upholds Abolition of Insanity 
Defense Against State and Federal Constitutional Challenges, 104 
Harv. L. R. 1132 (1991). 
In Patterson v. New York, the Court upheld a 
New York statute requiring that defendants prove 
the affirmative defense of extreme emotional 
disturbance by a preponderance of the evidence. 
According to the Court, this defense constituted 
"a separate issue" from the requisite element of 
mens rea. As a result, Patterson allows states 
to distinguish issues of mental illness from 
determinations of mens rea, suggesting that the 
former does not necessarily have any bearing on 
the latter. Furthermore, in Fisher v. United 
States, the Court upheld a trial court's refusal 
to instruct the jury to consider evidence of 
mental illness offered by the defendant to rebut 
the requisite mens rea for first-degree murder. 
The Court found that this refusal to instruct was 
a "matter peculiarly of local concern" lacking 
constitutional dimension. Patterson and Fisher 
therefore leave states free to erect procedural 
barriers that prevent defendants from 
establishing any relationship between mens rea 
and mental illness. Yet an interpretation of 
mens rea that excluded all issues of mental 
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illness would have the same effect as the three 
abolition statutes invalidated earlier this 
century as violations of due process. The Searcy 
court's distinction between the early type of 
abolition, which explicitly rejected the 
significance of psychiatric evidence, and the 
recent type of abolition, which reaches the same 
result under a narrow approach to mens rea, would 
thus appear overly formalistic. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
The decision in Korell is similarly flawed in that it fails 
to address relationship between mens rea and mental illness, and 
fails to recognize that evidence of mental illness affecting mental 
state at the time of the crime might be considered irrelevant as to 
mens rea. As the dissent in Searcy pointed out, lack of mens rea 
and insanity are separate doctrines which are treated as one by the 
majority in both Searcy and Korell. 
Because Searcy and Korell misinterpret Powell and Leiand 
and fail to consider the forms of insanity which affect mental state 
at the time of the crime, but do not negate intent to do the crime, 
they are not well reasoned and should not be embraced by this Court. 
In determining whether a practice is fundamental to 
fairness and justice and therefore protected by due process, courts 
look to the legal and moral history of the practice. See Leland, 
343 U.S. at 798; Searcy, 798 P.2d at 928. The history of the 
insanity defense demonstrates that a defense of mental 
nonresponsibility is a fundamental aspect of criminal justice. The 
"jurisprudential underpinnings" of the mental nonresponsibility 
(insanity) defense "reach back to origins of Western ethical and 
legal thought." ABA Standards at 324. 
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As early as the sixth century B.C., commentary on 
the Hebrew scriptures distinguished between 
harmful acts traceable to fault and those that 
occur without fault. To these ancient scholars, 
the paradigm of the latter type of act was one 
committed by a child, who was seen as incapable 
of weighing the moral implications of personal 
behavior, even when willful; retarded and insane 
persons were likened to children. See Piatt & 
Diamond, The Origins and Development of the "Wild 
Beast11 Concept of Mental Illness and Its Relation 
to Theories of Criminal Responsibility, 1 J. 
Hist. Behav. Sci. 355, 366 (1965) [hereinafter 
cited as Piatt & Diamond]. The Greek moral 
philosophers, at least as far back as fifth 
century B.C., considered the distinction between 
a culpable and nonculpable act to be among the 
"unwritten laws of nature supported by the 
universal moral sense of mankind." B. Jones, The 
Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks 264 (1956). 
The same view pervaded Roman law and appeared in 
the teaching of early Christian theologians. It 
emerged in Anglo-Saxon law no later than the 
twelfth century, the result of the "mutual 
influences and interaction of Christian theology 
and Anglo-Saxon law." Levitt, The Origin of the 
Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 111. L. Rev. 117, 136 
(1922). The idea was reinforced in England after 
the Norman invasion brought with it continental 
legal thought, itself strongly influenced by 
Christian ethics and canon law, which had already 
absorbed Jewish ethical teachings, classical 
philosophy, and Roman law. See Piatt & Diamond, 
supra, at 356. 
ABA Standards at 324 n.8. 
At the time the framers adopted the United States 
constitution, a defense of mental nonresponsibility was firmly 
entrenched in the English common law. See extensive discussion of 
common law evolution of insanity defense in Appellants7 memoranda 
filed in the trial court at RH. 92-95, RS. 47-9; see also Searcy, 
798 P.2d at 929; Quen, Psychiatry and the Law; Historical Relevance 
Today in By Reason of Insanity; Essays on Psychiatry and the Law, 
143, 154-7 (1987). 
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Early American case law "followed the development of the 
English cases and commentators in the rare instances that insanity 
was pleaded as a defense to crimes up until the holding in 
M'Naghten's case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843)." Searcy, 798 P.2d at 
931. See, e.g., In Re Clark, 1 City Hall Recorder (N.Y.) 176 
(1816); In Re Ball, 2 City Hall Recorder (N.Y.) 85 (1817). 
In 1843, the verdict in M'Naghten's case created public 
outcry and resulted in a set of rules which provided the basis for 
American court decisions on the insanity defense. Daniel M'Naghten 
was a Scottish woodcutter who assassinated Edward Drumond, believing 
him to be the Prime Minister. Because of M'Naghten's delusions, he 
believed the Prime Minister to be responsible for repeated personal 
misfortunes that M'Naghten suffered. Evidence of M'Naghten's mental 
illness was convincing, and he was acquitted.9 
At the request of the House of Lords, the English justices 
issued what came to be known as the M#Naghten standard: 
[I]t must be clearly proved that, at the time of 
committing the act, the party accused was 
labouring under such defect of reason, from 
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature 
and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did 
know it that he did not know he was doing what 
was wrong. 
Searcy, 798 P.2d at 931. 
9. The type of insanity suffered by M'Naghten would not have 
relieved him of culpability under Utah's current statute even though 
he was insane and his insanity impacted directly on his mental state 
at the time of the homicide. Nevertheless, M'Naghten knew he was 
killing a person and therefore would presumably have been unable to 
negate intent under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305. 
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The majority of American states adopted some form of the 
M'Naghten test. ABA Standards at 332.10 
In addition, the majority of states as well as the federal 
system continue to recognize an affirmative defense of insanity. 
See discussion supra at 14. 
Although the fact that the insanity defense has been 
universally accepted throughout this nation's history does not 
require a determination that the insanity defense is 
constitutionally mandated, it is an important factor to be 
considered in analyzing whether such a defense is "implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty" or fundamental to our system of 
jurisprudence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. at 798. 
The existence and acceptance of the defense at the time the 
framers adopted the constitution, the roots of the defense in 
Judeo-Christian notions of morality, and the pervasiveness of the 
defense throughout this nation's history and at the current time 
demonstrate that the defense is "so rooted in traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental." Leland, 343 
U.S. at 798 (quoting Snyder v. Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
As Justice McDevitt stated in his dissent in Searcy; 
The underlying theme of these various 
formulations of "due process" is a sense of 
10. The ABA Standards at 332 point out: 
By the turn of the century, about one-third of 
the states had nonresponsibility tests consisting 
of M'Naghten and the irresistible impulse rule; 
one state, New Hampshire, had the product rule; 
and the rest adhered to the M'Naghten test 
alone. This state of affairs remained 
"essentially unchanged" until the 1950s. 
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historical precedent upon which American 
institutions were founded and our continuing 
legal traditions. Thus, the proper focus in 
evaluating the place of a particular doctrine in 
the concept of due process is the pervasiveness 
of the doctrine in the history of the common 
law, A review of the extensive history of the 
insanity defense in the law of England and the 
United States leads to the conclusion that due 
process does require the availability of that 
defense to criminal defendants. 
State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d at 928. 
Because an affirmative defense of insanity is so 
fundamental to our system of justice, it is incorporated in the 
concept of due process as guaranteed by the United States 
constitution. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305, which eliminates an 
affirmative defense of insanity, is therefore unconstitutional.11 
B. THE GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL STATUTE DOES NOT 
MAKE UP FOR THE LACK OF A TRADITIONAL INSANITY 
DEFENSE. 
In determining whether Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 is 
unconstitutional, this Court must look to Utah's entire statutory 
11. Although evolving scientific knowledge and the need for a 
continuing application of any doctrine embraced by this Court 
counsel against formulation of a precise definition of insanity (see 
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. at 798; State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d at 
923), a review of the history of the insanity defense mandates that, 
at the very least, the M'Naghten standard is part of federal due 
process. That standard would allow a defendant to show that he did 
not know the nature and quality of his act or did not know that his 
act was wrong. Although the M'Naghten case did not occur until 
after the federal constitution was adopted, the notion that persons 
who, due to mental illness, did not know the nature and quality of 
their acts were not criminally responsible was in place when the 
constitution was adopted. See generally Searcy, 798 P.2d at 929. 
The M'Naghten standard has been used by a majority of the states, 
and remains in effect in most states. While scientific knowledge 
has since evolved to allow broader, more liberal definitions of 
insanity, at the very least, an insanity defense of this nature is 
mandated by federal due process. 
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scheme regarding the treatment of mentally ill offenders. See 
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. at 793 ("to determine the merit [of a 
fourteen amendment due process] challenge, the statute must be 
viewed in its relation to other relevant Oregon law . . . " ) . 
In State v. Sweezey, Judge Murphy ruled, based on "the 
presumption of constitutionality that attaches to legislative 
enactments," 
that although the right of the defendant to 
present a "traditional" insanity defense may rise 
to the level of a fundamental right, UCA 76-2-305 
offends neither the United States nor the Utah 
constitutions as long as it is read in 
conjunction with UCA 77-16a-2, which provides for 
a verdict of guilty and mentally ill. 
RS. 217. 
A review of the guilty and mentally ill ("GAMI") scheme 
demonstrates that the existence of such an alternative verdict does 
not compensate for the missing insanity defense. Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-16a-101 et. seq., when a defendant either pleads 
"guilty and mentally ill" or is found "guilty and mentally ill" by 
the trier of fact, the trial court conducts "a hearing to determine 
the defendant's present mental state." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-16-a-104(4) . 
Hence, according to the GAMI scheme, a defendant who was 
insane at the time of the incident and killed another believing the 
decedent to be an attacking Viet Cong, but at the time of sentencing 
has been medicated and is no longer suffering from delusions, would 
be treated like any other convicted defendant despite the GAMI 
statutes. 
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In State v. DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621, 627 (Utah 1987), the 
Court recognized that "a defendant can be found mentally ill even 
though his mental illness does not entirely negate the mens rea of 
the crime charged." It also recognized that a determination that 
one is guilty and mentally ill does not necessarily result in 
hospitalization. Id.; see also State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 
(Utah 1988). The trial judge must hold a hearing to determine not 
only whether the defendant is currently mentally ill, but also 
whether hospitalization is the appropriate disposition. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-16a-104. Hence, an individual who kills another 
while suffering insane delusions that the other person is an 
attacking Viet Cong and who continues to suffer delusions may 
nevertheless be sentenced to the prison either because the trial 
judge determines that hospitalization is not the appropriate 
disposition or because the trial judge determines that the person is 
not currently mentally ill. 
Furthermore, even if the trial judge hospitalizes the 
mentally ill individual, the mental health of that individual is 
reviewed at least every six months, and he can be transferred to the 
prison if he is found to no longer be mentally ill or to have 
received "maximum benefit."12 Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203. 
12. This "soft," undefined maximum benefit standard results in 
arbitrary and capricious decisions, in violation of due process. 
See generally State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1272. 
The "infirmities of the guilty and mentally ill scheme after 
hospitalization have not yet been explored by this Court. To the 
extent that this Court might consider relying on the GAMI statutes 
as being an cidequate substitute for the missing affirmative insanity 
(continued) 
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The fundamental notion at the base of the traditional 
insanity defense is that an insane person is not criminally 
responsible for his actions. The GAMI statutes do not protect this 
fundamental notion because mentally nonresponsible persons are 
nevertheless convicted and held criminally culpable; the only relief 
offered by GAMI statutes is that in some cases where the individual 
continues to be mentally illf he will be housed at the state 
hospital rather than the prison.13 
(footnote 12 continued) 
defense, it should be aware that the lack of definition of "maximum 
benefit" leads to arbitrary and capricious treatment of mentally ill 
offenders. In addition, an equal protection challenge based on the 
disparate treatment of mentally ill offenders exists. See ABA 
Standards at 393-4. 
13. The American Bar Association "disapproves of any type of 
guilty-but-mentally-ill (GBMI) verdict. This policy, adopted by the 
ABA House of Delegates in 1983, is also supported by the American 
Psychiatric Association, the National Mental Health Association 
Commission on the Insanity Defense, and virtually all commentators 
who have analyzed the subject." ABA Standards at 391 (footnotes 
omitted). The ABA Standards pointed out that 
the GBMI verdict is deficient for an important 
theoretical reason: It is not a proper verdict 
at all. Rather, it is a dispositional mechanism 
transferred to the guilt determination phase of 
the criminal process. The hybrid nature of the 
verdict is demonstrated by the fact that a jury 
determination of mental illness at the time of a 
charged offense is relevant not to criminal 
responsibility or culpability but to whether 
accused persons might receive treatment after 
they have been sentenced, a finding best made and 
acted upon after trial when information about 
various dispositional alternatives can be 
obtained and qualified experts consulted. Even 
if the GBMI verdict accurately identified 
offenders needing psychiatric treatment, which it 
apparently fails to do, it would not be a 
particularly useful innovation because virtually 
(continued) 
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The GAMI scheme is not a substitute for an insanity defense 
because (1) persons who were insane at the time of the crime can be 
found criminally culpable, (2) not all persons who were insane at 
the time of the crime will qualify as GAMI at the time of 
sentencing, (3) not all persons who are GAMI at the time of 
sentencing are actually sent to the hospital under the GAMI scheme, 
(4) those persons who are sent to the hospital can be transferred to 
the prison as soon as six months after sentencing, and (5) the GAMI 
statutes themselves suffer from constitutional infirmities. 
Utah's abolition of a separate defense of insanity violates 
federal due process. 
POINT II. UTAH'S STATUTORY SCHEME DENIES 
DEFENDANTS DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE STATE 
CONSTITUTION. 
(footnote 13 continued) 
every state already provides for the 
hospitalization of prisoners requiring inpatient 
care. 
If the goal is to reduce acquittals by 
reason of mental nonresponsibility [insanity], 
attention should be deflected to the proper scope 
of the nonresponsibility defense. If it is 
instituted to prevent permature release of 
persons found nonresponsible, criteria for 
committing and releasing them should be 
reexamined. If, instead, the concern is the 
proper treatment of mentally ill or mentally 
retarded offenders, sentencing and prison 
transfer provisions should be evaluated. The 
guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict fails to address 
any of these problems adequately. Instead, it 
adds a confusing and conceptually unjustifiable 
element to the criminal justice system. 
Id. at 393-4. 
The repeated, significant amendments of the Utah GAMI 
statutes suggest that the purpose and effect of such statutes are 
unclear and fail to protect mentally ill offenders or otherwise 
compensate for the missing insanity defense. 
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Article I, Section 7 of the Utah constitution provides that 
"[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without 
due process of law." That provision was adopted as part of the 
original Utah constitution in 1897 and has remained in effect 
throughout Utah's statehood. 
Although the language of Article I, Section 7 is identical 
to that of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the 
United States constitution, this Court has recognized that 
Article I, Section 7 provides greater due process protection in some 
contexts than does its federal counterpart. See State v. Ramirez# 
817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) (greater scrutiny given to eyewitness 
identification testimony under state due process than under federal 
due process); Foote v. Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991) 
(inmate has right to state due process at Board of Pardons hearing 
even though no federal due process right exists at such hearings). 
In addition, this Court has relied on Article I, Section 7 
of the Utah constitution to protect mentally ill offenders. See 
State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1272 (Utah 1988) (finding 
application of two subsections of Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5, the 
guilty and mentally ill statute, to mentally ill offenders arbitrary 
and capricious, in violation of state due process). 
The history of the insanity defense in Utah demonstrates 
that such a defense is a fundamental aspect of ordered liberty in 
this state and that the concept has not only existed, but has also 
been broadly defined. The affirmative defense of insanity has been 
recognized throughout Utah's history as a territory and state. The 
defense was firmly entrenched at the time the Utah constitution was 
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adopted in 1897, based on a recognition of the need for humane 
treatment of mentally ill persons and an acceptance of a moral and 
philosophical view that insane persons are not criminally culpable 
for their conduct. 
The recognition of the need for humane treatment of 
mentally ill persons is evident from the fact that Salt Lake City 
was the site of the first institution for mentally ill in the 
western United States. McKell, unpublished Master's thesis, History 
of the Utah State Hospital, University of Utah Library Archives. 
Twenty-four years prior to passage of the state constitution, 
territorial governor George C. Woods spoke of the need for the 
territorial government to address the problems of the mentally ill: 
We now number about one hundred thousand souls 
with a steady and rapid increase from every 
quarter. We ought to have an asylum for the 
insane. Humanity requires it. There is no 
public institution where these poor unfortunates 
can be kept. I should fail to do my duty were I 
to omit to urge you to take such steps 
immediately as will meet this great public want. 
Message of Governors 1850-1876. Bound Volume, Utah Historical 
Society, Salt Lake City, Utah, pp. 159-160. 
The laws of the territory provided for humane treatment of 
the mentally ill. 
Every person guilty of any unnecessarily harsh, 
cruel or unkind treatment of, or any neglect of 
duty towards, any idiot, lunatic or insane person 
is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
Laws of Utah, 1876, Ch. XI Sec. 193. 
The criminal nonresponsibility of insane individuals was 
also statutorily recognized prior to statehood when Utah was a 
- 32 -
territory. Title I, Chapter 1852, Section 22 of the compiled laws 
of the Territory of Utah identified those individuals legally 
capable of committing crimes. Section 22 explicitly recognized that 
insane persons are not criminally culpable: 
All persons are capable of committing crimes 
except those belonging to the following classes: 
First—children under the age of seven 
Second—children between the ages of seven 
and fourteen years in the absence of clear 
proof that at the time of committing the act 
charged against them they knew of its 
wrongfulness 
Third—Idiots 
Fourth—Lunatics and insane people 
Compiled laws of 1876 (emphasis added). See Addendum E for complete 
text of law. The statutory scheme recognizing that insane persons 
are not criminally culpable was maintained throughout the time 
predating statehood and was retained following statehood and 
adoption of our state constitution. See Compiled Laws of Utah 
§ 4387 (1888); revised statutes of the State of Utah § 4071 (1898).14 
Utah territorial case law recognized that insane persons 
were not criminally culpable. In 1888, nine years before the 
adoption of the Utah constitution, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The test of responsibility for a criminal act, 
when unsoundness of mind is set up as a defense, 
is the capacity of the defendant to distinguish 
between right and wrong at the time of and with 
14. The language of this territorial law was retained, with only 
changes in numbering, through 1973. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-41 
(1953), a copy of which is contained in Addendum E. In 1973, the 
Legislature repealed § 76-1-41 and enacted § 76-2-305, which adopted 
the A.L.I, definition. See footnote 3. See Addendum E for text of 
former insanity defense statutes. The A.L.I, definition remained in 
effect until the current statute was adopted in 1983. 
- 33 -
respect to the act which is the subject of the 
inquiry. The law presumes that the mind is in 
its normal condition until some evidence of 
unsoundness or imbecility appears. We understand 
that the capacity of a person accused of crime to 
determine whether the criminal act was right or 
wrong is the correct test of responsibility. If 
a man, with ability to refuse, kills another with 
the knowledge that it is wrong, he is responsible 
to the law for the act. 
Territory v. Catton, 16 P. 902, 908-9 (Utah 1888). This formulation 
of the defense embraces the M'Naghten rule but also appears to 
encompass th€> future "irresistible impulse test" by focusing on the 
defendant's "ability to refuse." 
In People v. Dillon, 3 P. 150 (Utah 1892), the majority 
affirmed the defendant's conviction of manslaughter. In his 
dissent, Justice Blackburn stated: 
The law cannot impose an obligation upon an 
insane person, for he is incapable of assuming 
obligations. He is not capable of acting in a 
legal sense; he is mentally incapable of making a 
defense; he is without mind; he cannot 
reason • • • • 
Justice Blackburn concluded: 
I am therefore convinced that a man should not be 
convicted of a crime where there is well founded 
doubt of his sanity at the time of its 
commission; that it is the law, and ought to be; 
and that it is founded in reason and humanity, 
and consistent with a Christian civilization. 
This view of the law is supported by many 
authorities . . . The reasoning in these cases is 
so forcible and in accordance with the well 
recognized principles of criminal pleading and 
evidence that no other is needed. 
Id. 30 P. at 154 (emphasis added). 
Hence, an insanity defense which relieved insane persons of 
criminal responsibility was in existence, defined and a fundamental 
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aspect of the criminal justice system when the Utah constitution was 
adopted. 
Following statehood, the mental nonresponsibility defense 
continued as a fundamental principle of Utah law. See State v. 
Brown, 102 P. 641 (Utah 1909). In Brown, the Utah Supreme Court 
reiterated that "[a]n insane person cannot legally be guilty of a 
criminal intent." Id. at 645. The Court recognized that an 
individual could have the requisite mens rea to commit a crime but 
nevertheless not be criminally culpable due to insanity. 
But if we assume that defendant intended to forge 
the checks, which he no doubt did, this is not 
alone sufficient to make an insane person guilty 
of a crime . . . .15 
"Ordinarily insane persons comprehend the nature 
of their acts. When they take a life or destroy 
property they usually know what they are doing, 
and often choose means singularly fitted to 
accomplish the end in view." The true test is 
whether the defendant, at the time of the 
commission of the offense, had the mental 
capacity to know that in doing the act he was 
doing wrong . . . "And where an individual lacks 
the mental capacity to distinguish right from 
wrong, in reference to this particular act 
complained of, the law will not hold him 
responsible." 
Id. at 645 (citations omitted). 
In conclusion, the Court compared the conviction of an 
innocent man who is sane to the conviction of an individual who is 
mentally nonresponsible and indicated that the latter was a greater 
wrong. 
15. This would be sufficient to make an insane person guilty under 
the current statute since the defendant would have the requisite 
mens rea. 
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To convict a sane man who is innocent is 
deplorable, but to sentence an insane man to the 
penitentiary for a crime that he did not have the 
mental capacity to commit would be intolerable. 
To concede that the law is impotent, and the 
courts powerless to avoid such a result, is a 
concession that we are not prepared to make. 
Id. at 646.16 
In State v. Green, 6 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1931), the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized that mental nonresponsibility is a complete 
defense requiring acquittal where a defendant did not know the 
nature of his act and that the act was wrong or was unable to 
control his actions due to mental disease or defect. This 
combination of the M'Naghten and "irresistible impulse" tests as the 
test for mental nonresponsibility was utilized in Utah until modern 
times. See, e.g., State v. Poulson, 381 P.2d 93 (Utah 1963) 
(ratifying combination of M'Naghten and "irresistible impulse" tests 
as mental nonresponsibility test in Utah); State v. Dominquez, 564 
P.2d 768, 770 (Utah 1977) (upholding insanity instruction "based 
primarily on a combination of the M'Naghten rule and "irresistible 
impulse" tests); State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah 1982) 
(noting that 1973 statutory change broadened "the insanity test to 
conform to current accepted principles of moral responsibility" and 
distinguishing between insanity and diminished capacity). 
Until 1983, when the current version of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-305 was adopted, Utah has had a mental nonresponsibility 
16. Although the Brown court considered sentencing "an insane man 
to the penitentiary for a crime he did not have the mental capacity 
to commit" to be "intolerable" and worse than convicting an innocent 
man, the current version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 permits such a 
result. 
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defense available for mentally ill offenders which "is one of the 
most liberal that can be found in the country." State v. Kirkham, 
319 P.2d 859, 861 (Utah 1958) (referring to instruction approved in 
Green).17 
The concept of mental nonresponsibility is found throughout 
Utah statutory and case law prior to 1983. See Addendum E for text 
of statutes; State v. Mewhinneyy 134 P. 632 (Utah 1913) (applying 
knowledge of right and wrong test for insanity); State v. Baer, 638 
P.2d 517 (Utah 1981) (concluding that lack of substantial evidence 
of insanity made insanity instruction unnecessary and implicitly 
recognizing distinction between negating mens rea and defense of 
insanity); State v. Mellen, 583 P.2d 46 (Utah 1978) (recognizing 
that in appropriate circumstances, testimony of lay witnesses as to 
defendant's insanity is admissible); State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 
643, 645 (Utah 1982) (noting that 1973 statutory changes broadened 
"the insanity test to conform to current accepted principles of 
moral responsibility" and distinguishing between insanity and 
diminished capacity); State v. Anselmof 148 P. 1071, 1074 (Utah 
1915) (distinguishing between evidence of insanity as a complete 
defense and evidence of mental impairment which impacts on ability 
to deliberate and premeditate); State v. Kirkhamf 319 P.2d at 861 
(pointing out that Utah provides one of broadest or most liberal 
17. In 1973, Utah "abandoned the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse 
test" and adopted the broader and more liberal A.L.I. Model Penal 
Code standard. Sessions, 645 P.2d at 645. See footnote 3 for text 
of the predecessor to the current statute. 
This former statute, based on the A.L.I. Model Penal Code, 
was even broader than the statute referred to in Kirkham since it 
required only that an individual lack "substantial capacity." 
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insanity defenses). As the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly 
recognized, in 1909 and at other times, insane individuals could not 
be convicted of crimes even though their acts may have been 
deliberate. Seey e.g., State v. Brown, 102 P. at 645. 
Case law from this Court following the enactment of the 
current version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 continues to evidence a 
concern for fair and humane treatment of mentally ill offenders. 
See State v. Copelandf 765 P.2d 1266; State v. DePlontyf 749 P.2d 
621. Throughout its history as a territory and state, Utah has 
shown a fundamental concern for humane treatment of mentally ill 
offenders and, up until 1983, a recognition that persons who are 
mentally nonresponsible cannot be criminally culpable. In addition, 
until the adoption of the current statute, Utah has been in tune 
with the evolving science of psychiatry and has employed some of the 
most progressive standards in defining mental nonresponsibility. 
Case law from other jurisdictions also supports a 
determination by this Court that a complete defense of mental 
nonresponsibility is required as a fundamental aspect of state due 
process under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah constitution. As 
previously outlined, three states have relied on their state and/or 
federal due process provisions in concluding that statutes which 
outlawed an affirmative insanity defense were unconstitutional. See 
State v. Strasburqf 110 P. 102; Sinclair v. State, 132 So.2d 581; 
State v. Lange, 123 So. 639. See discussion, supra, at 18-20. 
In addition, in State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d at 921, two of 
the five justices of the Idaho Supreme Court dissented from the 
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majority opinion, determining that abolition of the insanity defense 
violated state as well as federal due process. Searcy, 798 P.2d at 
921 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Johnson, 
joined by Justice McDevitt, discussed the state due process 
violation: 
The insanity defense was well established in the 
territory of Idaho at the time of the Idaho 
Constitutional Conventions and continued to be 
part of our jurisprudence until the Legislature 
purported to abolish it in 1982. It has been 
part of the process that was due defendants in 
criminal cases for virtually the entire existence 
of our Idaho legal system. It is fundamental to 
our jurisprudence and is protected by the due 
process clause of art. I, § 13. 
Searcy, 798 P.2d at 722 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting, 
joined by McDevitt, J.). 
This Court should follow the lead of the three older 
decisions, and the dissent in Searcy, and conclude that a defense of 
mental nonresponsibility which, at the very least, is based on a 
combination of the M'Naghten rule and irresistible impulse tests is 
constitutionally protected in this state.18 
The territorial constitution of the Territory of Deseret, 
article 8, section 8, recognized that lf[a]ll penalties and 
punishments shall be in proportion to the offense." That same 
18. Although a precise definition of insanity is not warranted in 
light of the evolving nature of the science, at the very least, a 
minimum threshold standard based on a combination of the M'Naghten 
and irresistible impulse rules is required in this state. M'Naghten 
was being followed when the Utah constitution was adopted, and 
language suggesting an irresistible impulse test appears in 
pre-statehood case law. See Catton, 16 P. at 908-9. In addition, 
this combination test was firmly established in Utah law shortly 
after the constitution was adopted. See Green, 6 P.2d at 184. 
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fundamental principle is stated in a slightly different context in 
the introductory provision of our current criminal code which 
mandates that persons "without fault" not be condemned as 
criminals. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104 (1953 as amended). 
The historical concern for mentally ill persons, the 
existence and fundamental acceptance of the insanity defense at the 
time the Utah constitution was adopted, the pervasiveness of the 
defense and its broad or progressive application throughout Utah's 
existence, and case law from other jurisdictions support Appellant's 
position that the right to a mental nonresponsibility defense where 
one is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or 
control his actions is a fundamental aspect of state due process. 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court find Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-305 unconstitutional, in violation of Article I, Section 7 of 
the Utah constitution.19 
POINT III. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 VIOLATES 
DUE PROCESS BY RELIEVING THE STATE OF THE BURDEN 
OF PROVING EVERY ELEMENT OF THE CRIME BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
A. FEDERAL DUE PROCESS 
Due process requires that the State prove every element of 
a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 
197, 206, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 2324, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). 
In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld an Oregon statute which required a defendant to 
19. The GAMI statutory scheme fails to relieve persons who were 
insane when they committed the crime from criminal culpability and 
fails to provide hospitalization for all mentally nonresponsible 
offenders (see discussion of GAMI statutes, supra, at 26-30). 
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establish the affirmative defense of insanity beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In so doing, the Court emphasized that despite this 
requirement, the statute required the State to prove mens rea, along 
with the other elements, beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The current Utah statute removes the traditional mental 
nonresponsibility defense and allows an insane defendant to rely on 
insanity only where it negates the mens rea. Even though insanity 
can be used only to negate the mens rea, i.e. to disprove an element 
of the crime, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-308 labels insanity as an 
"affirmative defense."20 Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-502, 
defendants must present evidence of an affirmative defense. This 
statutory scheme contrasts markedly with the scheme in Leland v. 
Oregon, where the state was required to establish mens rea beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
The United States Supreme Court has never directly 
addressed the issue of whether it violates federal due process to 
place the burden of production or proof of insanity on a defendant 
where the defendant can only use his mental illness to negate intent 
and no separate defense of insanity exists. The traditional 
presumption of sanity which has existed historically where a 
defendant has an affirmative defense of insanity available is of 
questionable validity when no such defense exists. Instead, 
requiring the defendant to produce or prove the insanity smacks 
against the due process requirement that the State prove all 
20. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-308 states: 
Defenses enumerated in this part constitute 
affirmative defenses. 
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elements beyond a reasonable doubt.21 
The United States Supreme Court has drawn a sharp line 
between situations where the defendant can be required to bear the 
burden of proof or production and those where he may not. See 
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 L.Ed.2d 67, 106 S. Ct. 
2411 (1986); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, 99 
S. Ct. 2450 (1979). 
That Court has stated: 
Lest there remain any doubt about the 
constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt 
standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process 
Clause protects the accused against conviction 
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 
which he is charged. 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 
(1970) . 
As the dissent pointed out in State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d at 
935, "mens rea and insanity are not one and the same." 
Under the rules enunciated in those [United 
States Supreme Court] cases, if the insanity 
defense is no more than an issue of whether the 
defendant entertained the necessary mens rea to 
commit the crime, then the holding of Leiand must 
fall, and the prosecution must bear the burden of 
proving the sanity of every defendant. 
Id. 
21. This tension emphasizes the weaknesses in the current Utah 
formulation of the insanity defense. While a presumption of sanity 
and the placement of a burden of production or proof on a defendant 
can be rationalized where insanity is an affirmative defense, where 
it is only a negation of the mens rea, placing any affirmative 
burden on the defendant, raises due process concerns. To some 
extent, the "presumption of sanity" becomes a "presumption of 
intent" where the only intent issue revolves around the defendant's 
sanity. 
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Defendants in Utah who attempt to negate the mens rea by 
r asserting insanity are required to present evidence. The 
presumption of sanity in the context of Utah/s current statute 
creates a presumption of intent which violates due process. 
B. STATE DUE PROCESS 
As previously outlined supra at 31, the due process clause 
of the Utah constitution provides greater protection than its 
federal counterpart in some contexts. See State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774; Foote v. Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734; State v. 
Copeland, 765 P.2d 1272. The history of this state suggests that 
the fair and humane treatment of mentally ill offenders is of 
fundamental importance. See discussion, supra, at 30-8. 
Given the pervasive concern for fair treatment of mentally 
ill offenders in this state, and the due process requirement that 
the State prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, the Utah 
statutory scheme which allows a defendant to use insanity only to 
negate the mens rea element, and then requires the defendant to go 
forward with evidence, violates Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
constitution. See discussion of federal violation, supra, at 40-3. 
POINT IV. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 IS ARBITRARY 
AND CAPRICIOUS IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
A. STATE CONSTITUTION 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah constitution protects 
against arbitrary and capricious laws. See State v. Copeland, 765 
P.2d at 1272. This Court has recognized that Article I, Section 7 
protects mentally ill offenders from arbitrary and capricious 
legislation which regulates whether they are to be afforded 
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treatment. Id.; see also discussion supra at 30-8 regarding broader 
protections under state due process. Just as the application of two 
sections of the former guilty and mentally ill statute to mentally 
ill offenders was arbitrary and capricious, the distinction made in 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 between offenders with the same severity 
of mental illness is arbitrary and capricious, in violation of 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah constitution. 
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah constitution provides, 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." The 
section and the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause "embody 
the same general principle: persons similarly situated should be 
treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not 
be treated as if their circumstances were the same." Greenwood v. 
City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816 (Utah 1991), quoting Malan v. 
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984) (footnotes omitted). 
Nonetheless, "The different language of Article I, § 24, the 
different constitutional contexts of the two provisions, and 
different jurisprudential considerations may lead to a different 
result in applying equal protection principles under Article I, § 24 
than might be reached under federal law." Id. 
Utah's strong, consistent history of treating mentally ill 
offenders in a humane and progressive fashion (see discussion supra 
at 30-9) suggests that disparate treatment of mentally ill offenders 
who suffer from the same type and severity of mental illness would 
violate Article I, Section 24 of the Utah constitution. 
Dr. Breck Lebegue, an experienced forensic psychiatrist, 
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testified that although not all persons who assault or murder others 
are mentally ill, of those that are mentally ill, "the most common 
diagnosis is one of psychosis; that is, a complete loss of reality, 
inability to think clearly and to relate to reality." RH. 310-11. 
Those with psychotic illness usually suffer from schizophrenia, "and 
the nature of that psychotic illness is a fixed false belief system" 
or delusion. RH. 313. Most persons who kill as a result of a fixed 
false belief or delusional system do not fit within Utah's current 
statutory definition of insanity. RH. 313. Such persons are 
compelled to kill by their delusional system but, nevertheless, do 
not fit within Utah's definition of insanity because they intend to 
cause the death of another. RH. 314, 317. 
Despite the existence of mental illness in a number of 
defendants, Dr. Lebegue thought (without checking his records) that 
he had found only one individual to be insane under Utah's current 
statutory definition since 1983. RH. 312. The one person who did 
qualify for an insanity defense under Utah's current law was a young 
male with a diagnosis of schizophrenia who experienced auditory 
hallucinations. RH. 314. As the result of commands given in the 
auditory hallucinations and in the context of a paranoid and 
delusional system, the man used a sword and attempted to kill what 
he thought was the devil but which was, in fact, his roommate. 
RH. 315. 
Dr. Lebegue defined two groups of mentally ill offenders 
who differ only in whether they know that they are hurting or 
killing a person. The larger group intends to kill a person while 
the smaller group does not, and thinks they are hurting the devil, a 
lemon, a robot, or some other non-person. RH. 317. While the 
groups differ as to the item being hurt, the severity of their 
mental illness and the biochemical changes in the brain which cause 
the schizophrenia would be the same. RH. 317-18. The only 
difference would be the content of the delusional belief. RH. 318. 
Persons in both groups are unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of 
their conduct. RH. 318; see also affidavits of Breck Lebegue 
contained in Addendum H. 
Utah law does not discriminate between the guilty and not 
guilty defendant on the basis of his ability to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his actions, his ability to control his actions or 
the severity of his mental illness. Instead, Utah law discriminates 
based on the form or nature of his delusional system. To determine 
guilt on such a senseless standard is unreasonable, arbitrary and 
inhumane, in violation of Article I, Sections 7 and 24 of the Utah 
constitution. 
B. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution 
also prohibits arbitrary and capricious legislation. See generally 
Nebba v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 
539 (1974). In addition, the fourteenth amendment equal protection 
clause protects against disparate treatment of persons similarly 
situated. See generally McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 85 
S. Ct. 283, 13 L.Ed.2d 222 (1964). "Whether a statute meets equal 
protection standards depends upon the objectives of the statute and 
whether the classifications established provide a reasonable basis 
for promoting those classifications." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d at 
670. 
For the reasons outlined in subsection (a) above, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-305 results in unreasonable classifications and 
arbitrary and capricious determinations of guilt, in violation of 
the fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection clauses. 
POINT V. UTAH'S STATUTORY SCHEME REGARDING 
MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS VIOLATES THE STATE AND 
FEDERAL PROSCRIPTIONS AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 
PUNISHMENT. 
A. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
The eighth amendments cruel and unusual punishment 
provision originated in the English Bill of Rights of 1689. See 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 158, 169 (1976). Its purpose in our 
constitution is to prohibit "infliction of uncivilized and inhuman 
punishments." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 268 (Brennan, J., 
concurring). As a general rule, no punishment can be imposed in the 
absence of culpability or blame. See Sinclair v. State, 132 So. 
581, 585-86 (Miss. 1931) (Ethridge, J.) (it is cruel and unusual 
punishment to convict a person of murder and impose a life sentence 
when he was insane and incapable of understanding the nature and 
quality of the act at the time the act was committed); Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (it is cruel and unusual 
punishment to punish one of his status as a drug addict);22 
22. In dicta, the Robinson court stated: 
It is unlikely that any State at this moment 
would attempt to make it a criminal offense for a 
(continued) 
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Powell v, Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (it is not cruel and unusual to 
punish defendant for his actions of being drunk in public; defendant 
not being punished for his status of being an alcoholic); State v. 
Strasburq, 110 P. 1020, 1022 (Wash. 1910) (insane person cannot be 
legally punished for acts committed by him while insane); State v. 
Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 P. 641, 645 (1909) (law cannot hold someone 
responsible who lacks mental capacity to distinguish between right 
and wrong). 
In Sinclair, Justice Ethridge23 of the Supreme Court of 
Mississippi concluded that to punish an insane person for a criminal 
act would be cruel and unusual and a violation of both the 
Mississippi and United States constitutions. Justice Ethridge 
repeated the common law concept that it is "shocking and inhuman to 
punish a person for an act when he does not have the capacity to 
know the act or judge its consequences." Sinclair, 132 So. at 584. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also restricted punishments for 
insane persons. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 102 P. at 646 
(footnote 22 continued) 
person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be 
afflicted with venereal disease . . . [A] law 
which made a criminal offense of such a disease 
would doubtless be universally thought to be an 
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666. 
23. The Supreme Court of Mississippi wrote a short per curiam 
decision holding that legislative attempts to abolish presentation 
of an insanity defense were unconstitutional in violation of 
Mississippi's due process clause. Justice Ethridge's opinion is a 
concurring opinion joined by Justices McGowen and Cook in which they 
address the cruel and unusual punishment issue. 
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(indicating that punishing an insane person for a crime is 
deplorable). 
Utah's current statutory scheme, which allows punishment of 
mentally ill offenders who could not appreciate the wrongfulness of 
their conduct, violates the eighth amendment. 
B. STATE CONSTITUTION 
Article I, Section 9 of the Utah constitution prohibits 
excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment. 
It also declares that fl[p]ersons arrested or imprisoned shall not be 
treated with unnecessary rigor." Id. The United States 
constitution contains no similar provision. At least three other 
state constitutions contain an unnecessary rigor provision: 
Wyoming,24 Indiana25 and Tennessee.26 
The other states with an unnecessary rigor provision 
generally apply it to abuses which occur during pretrial 
incarceration. See Suter v. State, 227 Ind. 648, 88 N.E.2d 386 
(1949) (unnecessary rigor provision applies to any place where 
24. Article I, Section 16 of the Wyoming constitution states that 
"No person arrested and confined in jail shall be treated with 
unnecessary rigor. The erection of safe and comfortable prisons, 
and inspection of prisons, and the humane treatment of prisoners 
shall be provided for." The Wyoming constitution includes a 
separate provision to address cruel and unusual punishments. 
Wyoming Const, art. I, § 14. 
25. The Indiana constitution protects persons arrested and confined 
in jail: "No person arrested, or confined in jail, shall be treated 
with unnecessary rigor." Indiana Const, art. I, § 15. Indiana's 
Article I, Section 16 addresses cruel and unusual punishments. 
26. Tennessee provides "That no person arrested and confined in 
jail shall be treated with unnecessary rigor." Tennessee Const, 
art. I, sec. 13. Tennessee's Article I, Section 14 addresses cruel 
and unusual punishment. 
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arresting officer may confine a defendant and also applies to period 
of determination prior to filing of charges and issuance and service 
of warrant); Saunders v, State, 216 Tenn. 425, 392 S.W.2d 916 (1965). 
Of the four states with unnecessary rigor provisions, only 
Utah's provision appears in the same section as the cruel and 
unusual punishment section. The constitution's drafters, by 
including unnecessary rigor and cruel and unusual punishment in the 
same section, presumably intended that they be interpreted as part 
of the cruel and unusual punishment proscription, and not as a 
separate provision regulating jail conditions. The unique 
development of Utah constitutional law supports this theory. 
The inclusion of the unnecessary rigor provision in Utah's 
constitution is probably in some part a result of the early Mormon 
persecutions of the 1830's. See L. Arrington & D. Bitton, The 
Mormon Experience, 76-77 (1979).27 The arrest and murder by 
vigilantes of Joseph and Hyrum Smith in 1844 had profound effect on 
the remaining church members and initiated the Mormon exodus to 
Utah. Id. 
The Mormons' persecution continued in Utah. The territory 
made six unsuccessful bids for statehood between 1849 and 1887. 
R. Poll and T. Alexander, Utah's Historyf 243. The primary obstacle 
27. Joseph Smith was a self-taught constitutional scholar and spent 
countless hours teaching constitutional principles to church 
subordinates. His students later became ecclesiastical and 
political leciders that undoubtedly made significant contributions in 
drafting Utah's numerous constitutions. See Wallentine, Heeding the 
Call Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution, 
article I, section 14, 17 Utah J. Contemp. L. 13 and n.57 (1991). 
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to statehood was the Mormons' practice of polygamy. Id. Many of 
the Mormon leaders who moved from Nauvoo to Utah were tried and 
jailed for violations of the Morrill Act of 186228 and Edmunds Act 
of 1882.29 The conditions of incarceration were described as 
wretched. Wallentine, supra, at 17. It was not uncommon for judges 
to jail women with small children and place several prisoners in one 
cell. Id. 
When Utah finally achieved statehood in the late 1890's, 
the drafters of the Utah constitution considered deleting the 
unnecessary rigor language in Article I, Section 9. Those who 
criticized the provision pointed out that no other state had that 
language in its constitution. See Official Report of the 
Proceedings and Debates of the Convention to Adopt a Constitution 
for the State of Utahf 267-68 b(1898). After returning from 
committee, the provision was retained. Its inclusion is a strong 
indication that the drafters felt a need for protections greater 
than those found in the federal constitution. Indeed, the history 
of Mormon persecution from the 1830's until 1896 provides ample 
evidence that the constitutional drafters were well aware of 
improper treatment of accused persons, and were committed to 
insuring that it did not happen in Utah. 
As discussed supra at 13, current Utah statutes preclude 
28. The Morrill Act of 1862 prohibited plural marriages, 
disincorporated the Mormon church, and restricted church ownership 
of property to $50,000. Utah's History, 244. 
29. The Edmunds Act declared polygamy a felony and defined 
polygamous living or unlawful cohabitation as a misdemeanor. Utah's 
History, 259. 
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an insanity defense except in the rarest of cases where insanity 
negates mens rea. Mentally ill offenders who were unable to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of the act are nevertheless criminally 
culpable and subject to incarceration if they had the requisite 
intent. 
Simultaneously with the elimination of the insanity 
defense, the Legislature created the option of guilty and mentally 
ill. 
As set forth supra at 26-30, the guilty and mentally ill 
statutes do not compensate for the missing insanity defense. 
Persons who were mentally nonresponsible for the crime nevertheless 
are incarcerated in most cases. Such defendants can be incarcerated 
at any of the following stages: (1) although mentally 
nonresponsible at the time of the crime, they no longer suffer from 
mental illness requiring hospitalization at the time of sentencing, 
(2) although insane at the time of the crime and still mentally ill 
at sentencing, the trial judge determines they cannot be treated or, 
for other reasons, should be sentenced to prison, or (3) insane at 
the time of the crime and mentally ill at the time of sentencing, it 
is determined shortly after they arrive at the hospital that they 
have received "maximum benefit" and they are transferred to the 
prison. Under each of these scenarios, persons who are mentally 
nonresponsible are incarcerated and held criminally culpable. 
Dr. Lebegue testified that mentally ill criminal defendants 
who suffer from schizophrenia require life-long management of 
symptoms through therapy and medication. A transfer to the prison 
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while still mentally ill ignores this treatment goal. The maximum 
benefit standard suggests that mentally ill offenders can be "cured" 
by participating in maximum treatment, a conclusion Dr. Lebegue 
specifically rejected. RH. 320-1. 
Imposing criminal responsibility on an offender who is 
unable to conform his conduct or appreciate wrongfulness constitutes 
"unnecessary rigor." In addition, Utah's treatment of mentally ill 
offenders, whereby they are usually committed to the Utah State 
Prison, is unnecessary rigor in violation of Article I, Section 9 of 
the Utah constitution. 
POINT VI. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-4 VIOLATES A 
DEFENDANT'S STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4 (Supp. 1991) provides: 
(1) When the court receives notice that a 
defendant intends to claim that he is not guilty 
by reason of insanity or that he had diminished 
mental capacity, the court shall order the 
Department of Human Services to examine the 
defendant and investigate his mental condition. 
(2) The defendant shall make himself available 
and fully cooperate in the examination by the 
department and any other independent examiners 
for the defense and the prosecuting attorney. If 
the defendant fails to make himself available and 
fully cooperate, and that failure is established 
to the satisfaction of the court at a hearing 
prior to trial, the defendant is barred from 
presenting expert testimony relating to his 
defense of mental illness at the trial of the 
case. 
A. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
The fifth amendment to the United States constitution 
provides that fl[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal 
- 53 -
case to be a witness against himself . . . ." The protections of 
the fifth amendment apply outside of the courtroom, Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) , and to court-ordered psychiatric 
evaluations. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 1866, 68 
L.Ed.2d 359 (1981). 
There is a split of authority regarding whether the filing 
of a notice of an intent to rely on a traditional affirmative 
defense of insanity constitutes a waiver of the fifth amendment 
privilege. The question has provided a variety of opinions as well 
as scholarly debate. Danforth, Death Knell for Pre-Trial Mental 
Examination? Privilege Against Self-incrimination, 19 Rutgers L. 
Rev. 489 (1965); Note, Reguiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a 
Government Psychiatric Examination; An Invasion of the Privilege 
Against Self-incrimination, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 648 (1970). 
Many courts have ruled that a defendant who raises an 
insanity defense cannot be compelled to give evidence against 
himself. 
A person accused of a crime who enters a plea of 
not guilty by reason of insanity, cannot be 
compelled to carry on conversations against his 
will under the penalty of forfeiture of the 
defense for failure to respond to questions, or 
for a refusal to "cooperate" with persons 
appointed to examine him. The statute which 
prescribes the procedures to be followed upon the 
entry of a plea of not guilty by reason of 
insanity cannot operate to destroy the 
constitutional safeguards against self-
incrimination . 
French v. District Court Division 9, 384 P.2d 268, 270 (Colo. 
1963). Accord Commonwealth v. Pomponi, 284 A.2d 708 (Penn. 1971); 
United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3rd Cir. 1975); Shepard v. 
Bowe, 442 P.2d 238 (Or. 1968). 
Other courts have rejected that position and held that the 
assertion of an "insanity defense" waives the constitutional 
privilege. They have only allowed a court-ordered examination, 
however, when the defendant has asserted the affirmative defense of 
insanity, and when there is a statutory or court-imposed ban on use 
of the evidence gathered in the guilt phase of the trial. See, 
e.g., State ex. rel Sikorav Dist. Ct. of 13th Jud. Dist., 462 P.2d 
897, 899 (Mont. 1968). 
Where a defendant is required to be examined and waive the 
privilege against self-incrimination, statutes limiting the 
introduction of the evidence to rebut insanity and precluding use of 
the evidence during the guilt phase often exist. The federal 
provision, 18 U.S.C. 4244, is typical. 
No statement made by the accused in the course of 
any examination into his sanity or mental 
competency provided for by this section whether 
the examination shall be with or without the 
consent of the accused, shall be admitted in 
evidence against the accused on the issue of 
guilt in any criminal proceeding. 
In Utah, no such statutory limitation exists. In addition, 
in Utah, a defendant can use insanity only to negate the mens rea; 
no distinct defense of mental nonresponsibility exists. Hence, in 
Utah, a defendant is required to be examined in order to put on 
evidence to negate an element. Where a defendant can only put on 
evidence of insanity to negate an element, the examination 
requirement conflicts with due process and the right against 
self-incrimination. 
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In State v. Volser, 345 N.W.2d 806 (Neb. 1984), the Supreme 
Court of Nebraska considered whether a defendant that did not raise 
an insanity defense, but had called mental health experts in the 
process of contesting the elements of the offense, could be forced 
to undergo an evaluation by the state's experts. The court held: 
While . . . a court may have the inherent power 
to order a psychiatric examination of a defendant 
who places his sanity in issue, such is not the 
case when a defendant is only attempting to rebut 
the existence of the intent element of a crime 
with which he is charged. When one pleads 
insanity and offers evidence on that issue, such 
a plea carries with it an implicit, although not 
legally operative, admission of the State's 
charges. Such a plea necessarily carries with it 
the assertion that the commission of the actf 
along with the intent, was the result of the 
defendant's inability to understand the nature 
and quality of the act or distinguish right from 
wrong. 
On the other hand, a person who introduces 
evidence of his mental condition to rebut the 
presumption that the act he performed was coupled 
with the requisite intent makes no admission of 
the crime. Such evidence is offered to show only 
that the crime charged was not committed. It 
carries with it no concession of the State's case 
and does not interject an issue foreign to the 
State's burden of proof. Throughout the 
proceedings, the State is contending that the 
defendant committed the crime, and the defendant 
is contending he did not. In such a situation the 
fifth amendment requires that the State prove its 
case without compelling the defendant to submit 
to interview by those in its employ. [citations 
omitted] 
Id. at 813 (emphasis added). 
The same result was reached in United States v. Alvarez, 
519 F.2d 1036 (3rd Cir. 1975), wherein the court stated: 
Some courts have said, either expressly or 
implicitly, that a court may compel a defendant 
to submit to a psychiatric examination for the 
_ R£ _ 
purpose of determining his sanity at the time of 
the offense, and that the prosecution may use the 
psychiatrist's testimony at the trial. A 
considerable literature questioning and 
criticizing the propriety of this kind of 
procedure has developed. This circuit is 
committed to the position that use at trial of 
statements exacted by the compulsion where a 
court ordered psychiatric examination, at least 
where any statement elicited in the examination 
tends to establish the fact of the offense or the 
voluntariness of other statements by the accused, 
is a violation of the privilege against self 
incrimination. United States ex rel. Smith v. 
Yeaqerf 451 F.2d 164 (3rd Cir.), aff'q. 336 
F.Supp. 1287, 1305 (D.N.J. 1971). See also 
Commonwealth v. Pomponi/ 284 A.2d 708 (Penn. 
1971). 
Although the defendant in each of these cases has filed a 
notice of intent to contest the mens rea element of the offense, the 
insanity defense in Utah provides no other basis for 
nonresponsibility. Requiring a defendant to give evidence against 
himself in order to defend against the elements of the crime 
violates his rights as guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the 
United States constitution. 
B. STATE CONSTITUTION 
The fifth amendment to the United States constitution 
provides in part that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself." Article I, Section 12 of the 
Utah constitution provides that "the accused shall not be compelled 
to give evidence against himself." The distinct language coupled 
with this state's history and policy considerations demonstrate that 
Article I, Section 12 provides greater protection to the individual 
than its federal counterpart. 
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In American Fork v. Crosqrove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985), 
this Court analyzed Article I, Section 12, holding that it applied 
only "to those situations where the state seeks evidence of a 
testimonial or communicative nature." Id. at 1075. Under this 
standard, the right of the individual not to reveal his thoughts in 
the face of accusations by the State—the most fundamental right 
sought to be protected by the privilege against self-incrimination— 
remains inviolate. See Id. 
The Crosqrove majority also cited to the common law history 
of the constitutional privilege. 
It is widely acknowledged that the common-law 
privilege against self-incrimination was aimed 
directly at the inquisitorial system of the 
English ecclesiastical courts, traces of which 
began to creep into the civil-law system at an 
early date. Under this system, the accused could 
be required to take an oath to answer truthfully 
all questions directed to him. Thus, he was 
placed in the "cruel trilemma" of having to 
answer truthfully (which, depending on how 
skillfully the questions were framed, could 
incriminate him even if he were innocent of the 
offense), commit perjury, or remain silent and be 
found in contempt of court. 
Crosqrovef 701 P.2d at 1073 (citations omitted). 
The type of inquisitorial procedure condemned in Crosqrove 
was used against Mormon polygamists during the federal raids. 
Entire families were put into jail if they refused to "cooperate" 
with the federal marshalls. Bradley, Hide and Seek: Children on 
the Underground, 51 Utah Hist. Q. 133, 142 (1983); Ex Parte Harris, 
5 P. 129 (Utah 1884). The drafters of our constitution were no 
doubt sensitive to the need to protect against government 
overreaching. 
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With a history so rich in government-sanctioned persecution 
and intimidation, any protection against government interference 
must have been of critical importance to the drafters of our state 
constitution. Since these rights and protections were so important 
to the drafters of our constitution, Article I, Section 12 must be 
construed so as to disallow a procedure where the defendant is 
forced to "cooperate" with an agency of the state in order to 
present a defense which negates an element. 
The rationale in State v. Volser# 345 N.W.2d 806, that a 
defendant cannot be compelled to submit to an examination should be 
followed. See also French v. Dist. Ct., 384 P.2d 268; Comm. v. 
Pomponi# 284 A.2d 708; United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036. 
Given the unique Utah historical perspective, this Court 
should find the inquisitorial procedures of § 77-14-4 violative of 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants Herrera and Sweezey respectfully request that 
this Court reverse the trial judges' orders denying their motions to 
"Declare Utah Statutory Scheme Unconstitutional," and remand the 
cases for trial. 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Regular February Term, 1992 May 13, 1992 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. No. 920209 
Tomas R. Herrera, 911901075FS 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Appellant's Petition for Interlocutory Appeal having 
been considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised in 
the premises, it is ordered that an Interlocutory Appeal 
be, and the same is, granted as prayed. 
ADDENDUM B 
i-fife_e=u 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
'JUN 21992, 
£^J&*^ . 
<v plarv T Moonan 
Cten< or ' t e Court 
Uten Court of Appeals 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
MiJcell Sweezey, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
ORDER OF CERTIFICATION 
Case No. 920289-CA 
Before Judges Orme, Bench, Billings, and Garff. 
This matter is before the court on a stipulated petition for 
permission to file an interlocutory appeal and motion to certify 
this case to the Utah Supreme Court. 
Pursuant to Rule 2 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
this court hereby suspends the requirement in Rule 43 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure that requires that a suggestion of 
transfer may not be filed prior to the docketing statement. The 
petition for interlocutory appeal satisfies the requirement of a 
docketing statement under Rule 43. Now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that the petition for permission to file an interlocutory 
appeal is certified to the U^ah Supreme Court. 
Dated this day of-May^ 1992. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Russell W/ Bench, Judge 
fczfrS/ft / ; 
J u p t h M . B i l l i n g s , JOcl 
1 
i 
44r^ SO Regnal W. ^Garff /"Jtfdge/ 
( 
v 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
- ~ - -oo 0 oo~ - ~ 
Regular May Term, 1992 August 4, 1992 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff arid Appellee, 
v. 1 1'ci) 920265 
Mikell Sweezey, 921900092FS 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
The motion for interlocutory appeal was inadvertently 
den i ed by the n 3 u Il y 29. 1 992. " sua 
sponte, having reconsidered its action and being fully advised 
in the premises, orders that the interlocutory appeal be, ai id 
t he same 11, qranted , »i«? , prayed The district court, is 
directed to transfer the record to this court. 
This appeal is hereby consolidated with the similar 
appeal in State , Herrera No. 920209 for the 'purposes of 
calendaring a argument. 
By T ni i onJ r t 
ADDENDUM D 
TEXT OF STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment XIV to the Const itut inn nl I he (lulled Sfiite,*. pi ovules in 
pertinent part: 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Amendmei it V" tc • tl ie Consti tutj 01 i • ::  >f t h e I Jnited States pi: o\ Ides: 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of ] :i fe, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
Amendment VIII to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
Excessive bail
 Shall not be required nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec.
 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
+ * testify in his own behalf ^ *A confronted by 
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in 
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or 
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband 
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice 
put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines—Cruel 
punishments•] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; 
excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall 
cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. 
Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be 
treated with unnecessary rigor. 
Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 provides: 
76-2-305. Mental illness—Use as a defense— 
Influence of alcohol or other substance 
voluntarily consumed—Definition. 
(1) It is a defense to a prosecution under 
any statute or ordinance that the defendant, as a 
result of mental illness, lacked the mental state 
required as an element of the offense charged. 
Mental illness is not otherwise a defense. 
i The defense defined in this section 
includes the defenses known as "insanity" and 
"diminished mental capacity." 
(3) A person who is under the influence of 
voluntarily consumed or injected alcohol, 
controlled substances, or volatile substances at 
the time of the alleged offense is not excused 
from criminal responsibility on the basis of 
mental illness. 
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental disease 
or defect that substantially impairs a person/s 
mental, emotional, or behavioral functioning. A 
mental defect may be a congenital condition, the 
result of injury, or a residual effect of a 
physical or mental disease and includes, but 
not limited to, mental retardation. Mental 
illness does not mean a personality or character 
disorder or abnormality manifested only by 
repeated criminal conduct. 
(5) "Mental retardation" means a 
significant subaverage general intellectual 
functioning, existing concurrently with deficits 
adaptive behavior, and manifested during the 
developmental period as defined by the current 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American 
Psychiatric Association. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-14-4 provides: 
1 7 • 1 4 I Mental examination or defendant. 
(1) 'When the court receives notice that a 
defendant intends to claim that he is not guilty 
by reason of insanity or that he had diminished 
mental capacity, the court shall order the 
Department of Human Services to examine the 
defendant and investigate his mental condition. 
The person or organization directed by the 
department to conduct the examination shall 
testify at the request of the court or either 
party in any proceeding in which the testimony is 
otherwise admissible. Pending trial, unless the 
court or the executive director directs 
otherwise, the defendant shall be retained in the 
same custody or status he was i n at the time the 
examination was ordered. 
(2) The defendant shall make himself 
available and fully cooperate i n the examination 
by the department and any other independent 
examiners for the defense and the prosecuting 
attorney. If the defendant fails to make himself 
available and fully cooperate, and that failure 
is established to the satisfaction of the court 
at a hearing prior to trial, the defendant is 
barred from presenting expert testimony relating 
to his defense of mental illness at the trial of 
the case. The department shall complete the 
examination within 30 days after the court's 
order, and shall prepare and provide to the court 
prosecutor and defense counsel a written report 
concerning the condition of the defendant. 
(3) Within ten days after receipt of the 
report from the department, but not later than 
five days before the trial of the case, or at any 
other time the court directs, the prosecuting 
attorney shall file and serve upon the defendant 
a notice of rebuttal of the defense of mental 
illness, which shall contain the names of 
witnesses the prosecuting attorney proposes to 
call in rebuttal. 
(4) The reports of any other independent 
examiner are admissible as evidence upon 
stipulation of the prosecution and defense. 
(5) This section does not prevent any party 
from producing any other testimony as to the 
mental condition of the defendant. Expert 
witnesses who are not appointed by the court are 
not entitled to compensation under Subsection (7). 
(6) This section does not require the 
admission of evidence not otherwise admissible. 
(7) Expenses of examination ordered by the 
court under this section shall be paid by the 
Department of Human Services. Travel expenses 
associated with the examination incurred by the 
defendant shall be charged by the department to 
the county where prosecution is commenced. 
Examination of defendants charged with violation 
of municipal or county ordinances shall be 
charged by the department to the entity 
commencing the prosecution. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-16a-103 provides: 
77-16a-103. Plea of guilty and mentally ill. 
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill 
being tendered by a defendant to any charge, the 
court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable 
time to determine whether the defendant is 
mentally ill. 
(2) The court may order the department to 
examine the defendant, and may receive the 
testimony of any public or private expert witness 
offered by the defendant or the prosecutor. The 
defendant may be placed in the Utah State 
Hospital for that examination only upon approval 
by the executive director. 
(3) (a) A defendant who tenders a plea of 
guilty and mentally ill shall be examined 
first by the trial judge, in compliance with 
the standards for taking pleas of guilty. 
THe defendant shall be advised that a plea 
of guilty and mentally ill is a plea of 
guilty and not a contingent plea. 
(b) If the defendant is later found 
not to be mentally ill, that plea remains a 
valid plea of guilty, and the defendant 
shall be sentenced as any other offender. 
(4) If the court concludes that the 
defendant is currently mentally ill his plea 
shall be accepted and he shall be sentenced in 
accordance with Section 77-16a-104. 
(5) (a) When the offense is a state 
offense, expenses of examination, 
observation, and treatment for the defendai it 
shall be paid for by the department. 
(b) Travel expenses shall be paid by 
the county where prosecution is commenced. 
(c) Expenses of examination for 
defendants charged with violation of a 
municipal or county ordinance shall be paid 
by the municipality or county that commenced 
the prosecution 
Utah Code Ann. §77-16a-202 provides: 
77-16a~202. GuiJ1 \ and menta LII—Commitment 
to department. 
(1) In sentencing and committing a mentally 
ill offender to the department under Subsection 
77-16a-104(3)(a), the court shall: 
(a) sentence the offender to a term of 
imprisonment and order that he be committed 
to the department for care and treatment 
until transferred to UDC in accordance with 
Sections 77-16a-203 and 77-16a-204; or 
(b) sentence the offender to a term of 
imprisonment and order that he be committed 
to the department for care and treatment for 
no more than 18 months, or until he has 
reached maximum benefit, whichever occurs 
first. At the expiration of that time, the 
court may recall the sentence and 
commitment, and resentence the offender, A 
commitment and retention of jurisdictir 
under this subsection shall be committed in 
accordance with Subsection (a). 
(2) The court may not retain jurisdiction, 
under Subsection (l)(b), over the sentence of a 
mentally ill offender who has been convicted of a 
capital offense. In capital cases, the court 
shall make the findings required by this section 
after the capital sentencing proceeding mandated 
by Section 76-3-207. 
(3) When an offender is committed to the 
department under Subsection (1)(b), the 
department shall provide the court with reports 
of the offender's mental health status every six 
months. Those reports shall be prepared in 
accordance with the requirements of Section 
77-16a-203. Additionally, the court may appoint 
an independent examiner to assess the mental 
health status of the offender. 
(4) The period of commitment may not exceed 
the maximum sentence imposed by the court. Upon 
expiration of that sentence, the administrator of 
the facility where the offender is located may 
initiate civil proceedings for involuntary 
commitment in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 
12 or Title 62A, Chapter 5. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-16a-203 provides: 
77-16a-203. Review of guilty and mentally ill 
persons committed to department—Recommendations 
for transfer. 
(1) The executive director shall designate 
a review team of at least three qualified staff 
members, including at least one licensed 
psychiatrist, to evaluate the mental condition of 
each mentally ill offender committed to it in 
accordance with Section 77-16a-202, at least once 
every six months. If the offender is mentally 
retarded, the review team shall include at least 
one individual who is a designated mental 
retardation professional, as defined in Section 
62A-5-301. 
(2) At the conclusion of its evaluation, 
the review team described in Subsection (1) shall 
make a report to the executive director regarding 
the offender's current mental condition, his 
progress since commitment, prognosis, and a 
recommendation regarding whether the mentally ill 
offender should be transferred to UDC or remain 
in the custody of the department. 
(3) The executive director shall notify the 
UDC medical administrator, and the board's 
mental health adviser that a mentally ill 
offender is eligible for transfer to UDC if 
the review team finds that the offender: 
(i) is no longer mentally ill; or 
(ii) is still mentally ill and 
continues to be a danger to himself 01 
others, but can be controlled if 
adequate care, medication, and 
treatment are provided, and that he has 
reached maximum benefit from the 
programs within the department, 
(b) The administrator of the mental health 
facility where the offender is located shall 
provide the UDC medical administrator with a 
copy of the reviewing staff's recommendation 
and: 
(i) all available clinical facts; 
(ii) the diagnosis; 
(iii) the course of treatment, received 
at the mental health facility; 
(iv) the prognosis *or remission of 
symptoms; 
(v) the potential i recidivism; 
(vi) an estimation of the offender's 
dangerousness, either to himself or 
others; and 
(vii) recommendations for future 
treatment. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-16a-204 provides: 
77-16a-204. Guilty and mentally ill—UDC 
acceptance of transfer. 
(1) The UDC medical administrator shall 
designate a transfer team of at least three 
qualified staff members, including at least one 
licensed psychiatrist, to evaluate the 
recommendation made by the department's review 
team pursuant to Section 77-16a-203. If the 
offender is mentally retarded, the transfer team 
shall include at least one person who has 
expertise in testing and diagnosis of mentally 
retarded individuals. 
(2) The transfer team shall concur in 
recommendation if it determines that UDC can 
provide the mentally ill offender with the level 
of car necessary to maintain his mental condition, 
(3) The UDC transfer team and medical 
administrator shall recommend the facility in 
which the offender should be placed and the 
treatment to be provided in order for his mental 
condition to remain stabilized to the director of 
the Division of Institutional Operations, within 
the Department of Corrections. 
(4) In the event that the department and 
UDC do not agree on the transfer of a mentally 
ill offender, the administrator of the mental 
health facility where the offender is located 
shall notify the mental health adviser for the 
board, in writing, of the dispute. The mental 
health adviser shall be provided with copies of 
all reports and recommendations. The board's 
mental health board shall make a recommendation 
to the board on the transfer and the board shall 
issue its decision within 30 days. 
(5) UDC shall notify the board whenever a 
mentally ill offender is transferred from the 
department to UDC. 
ADDENDUM E 
TEXT OF FORMER STATUTES 
Title I, Chapter 1952, Secti on. «! / „ i.v.rnpi U'ti haw;;,, r.f 
Territory of Utah (1876) provided: 
(1852.) Sec. 22. All persons are capable of 
committing crimes, except those belonging to the 
following classes: 
First—Children under the age of seven years; 
Second—Children between the ages of seven 
and fourteen years in the absence of clear proof 
that at the time of committing the act charged 
against them they knew its wrongfulness. 
Third—Idiots. 
Fourth—Lunatics and insane persons. 
Fifth—Persons who committed the act or made 
the omission charged, under an ignorance or 
mistake of fact which disproves any criminal 
intent; 
Sixth—Persons who committed the act charged 
without being conscious thereof. 
Seventh—Persons who committed the act or 
made the omission charged, through misfortune or 
by accident, when it appears that there was no 
evil design, intention, or culpable negligence. 
Eighth—Married women (unless the crime is 
punishable with death) acting under the threats, 
command, or coercion of their husbands; 
Ninth—Persons (unless the crime is 
punishable with death) who committed the act or 
made the omission charged under threats or 
menaces sufficient to show that they had 
reasonable cause to, and did believe their lives 
would be endangered if they refused. 
t v-;*r Compiled Laws of Utah (1888) , §18 52 was renumbered 
to §4387 with language change. 
§4387. All persons are capable of 
committing crimes, except those belonging tc » the 
following classes: 
1. Children under the age of seven years. 
2. Children between the ages of seven years 
and fourteen years in the absence of clear proof 
that at the time of committing the act charged 
against them they knew its wrongfulness. 
3. Idiots. 
4. Lunatics and insane persons. 
5. Persons who committed the act or made 
the omission charged, under an ignorance or 
mistake of fact which disproves any criminal 
intent. 
6. Persons who committed the act charged 
without being conscious thereof. 
7. Persons who committed the act or made 
the omission charged, through misfortune or by 
accident, when it appears that there was no evil 
design, intention, or culpable negligence. 
8. Married women (unless the crime be 
punishable by death) acting under the threats, 
command or coercion of their husbands. 
9. Persons (unless the crime be punishable 
with death) who committed the act or made the 
omission charged under threats or menaces 
sufficient to show that they had reasonable cause 
to, and did believe their lives would be 
endangered if they refused. 
The 1907, 1917, 1933 and 1943 versions of the statute 
remained substantively the same, with only a change in numbering. 
Penal Code, Chapter 2.7915 (4071); Penal Code §103-1-40. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-41 (1953) contained the same 
substantive language. It provided: 
76-1-41. Who are capable of committing 
crime.—All persons are capable of committing 
crimes, except those belonging to the following 
classes: 
(1) Children under the age of seven years. 
(2) Children between the ages of seven 
years and fourteen years, in the absence of clear 
proof that at the time of committing the act 
charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness. 
(3) Idiots. 
(4) Lunatics and insane persons. 
(5) Persons who commit the act or make the 
omission charged under an ignorance or mistake of 
fact which disproves any criminal intent. 
(6) Persons who commit the act charged 
without being conscious thereof. 
(7) Persons who commit the act or make the 
omission charged through misfortune or by 
accident, when it appears that there is no evil 
design, intention or culpable negligence. 
(8) Married women, unless the crime is 
punishable with death, acting under the threats, 
command or coercion of their husbands. 
(9) Persons, unless the crime is punishable 
with death, who commit the act or make the 
omission charged under threats or menaces 
sufficient to show that they have reasonable 
cause to believe, and do believe, their lives 
will be endangered if they refuse. 
This language remained in effect until 19 73 when the 
Legislature adopted Utah Code Ann. §76-2-305. Utah Code Ann. 
§76-2-305 (1983) provided: 
76-2-305. Mental disease or defect. 
(1) In any prosecution for an offense, * + 
shall be a defense that the defendant, at the 
time of the proscribed conduct, as a result of 
mental disease or defect, lacked substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of 
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law. 
(2) As used in this section, the terms 
"mental disease" or "defect" do not include an 
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal 
— otherwise antisocial conduct. 
ADDENDUM F 
LISA J. REMAL, (#2722) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MIKELL SWEEZEY, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DECLARE UTAH 
STATUTORY SCHEME IN REGARDS 
TO MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND NOTICE 
OF HEARING 
Case No. 921900092FS 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
The defendant, MIKELL SWEEZEY, through his attorney, LISA 
J. REMAL, hereby moves this Court to declare the statutory scheme in 
regards to mentally ill offenders unconstitutional including, but 
not limited to the following statutes: Utah Code Ann. 76-2-305, 
76-5-205(2), 77-14-3, 77-14-4 (Supp. 1990). Defendant further 
requests that this court instruct the jury regarding the defenses of 
insanity and diminished capacity. In support of this motion, 
defendant alleges the following specific violations of his state and 
federal constitutional rights. 
1. That defendant is denied due process of law as 
guaranteed in Article I, Section 7 and 27 of the Utah State 
0027 
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitutions in that defendant is denied the right to 
present a defense that is fundamental to our jurisprudence and was 
incorporated within the concept of due process at the time due 
process was guaranteed to all citizens by passage of the State and 
Federal Constitutions. 
2. That defendant is denied due process of law, equal 
protection of law, and uniform operation of the laws as guaranteed 
in Article I, Section 2, 7, 24, and 27 of the Utah State 
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution in the manner in which §76-2-305 has been 
applied. Defendant specifically alleges that application of 
§76-2-305 is inconsistent, and criminal responsibility is imposed 
arbitrarily and capriciously and without consideration to actual 
culpability, and condemns in an inconsistent manner conduct that is 
without fault. State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) Utah 
Code Ann. 76-1-104(2)(4 ) (Supp. 1990). 
3. That Defendant is denied equal protection of the law, 
and uniform operation of laws is guaranteed by the above-cited 
Federal and States constitutions in that the following statutes 
discriminate against mentally ill persons charged with crimes: 
A) Under §76-5-205(2) Defendant as a mentally ill 
person is denied the right to mitigation of the offenses charged in 
Count I that is afforded to other persons similarly situated. 
-2 -
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B) Defendant as a mentally ill person is forced to 
waive his right to remain silent and not give evidence against 
himself and may be precluded from contesting an element of the 
offense if he chooses not to give evidence against himself. 
C) Under §76-2-305, because Defendant is a mentally 
ill person, an element of the offense is converted to an affirmative 
defense and the state may be able to prove its case with a different 
and lesser standard of proof than would be required if the Defendant 
were not mentally ill. Utah Code Ann. 76-l-502(b) (1990 Supp). 
4. That treatment of Defendant and other mentally ill 
offenders under the Utah statutory scheme constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment and unnecessary rigor in violation of Article I, 
Section 9 of the Utah State Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution in the following particulars. 
A) Failure to recognize a different standard for 
imposing responsibility when the Defendant because of mental illness 
is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, or is 
unable to conform conduct to the requirements of law, constitutes 
unnecessary rigor, and is contrary to the fundamental principles 
upon which our constitution was conceived. Article I section 27, 
Utah State Constitution. 
B) Failure to recognize the need for disparate 
treatment or punishment for mentally ill offenders constitutes cruel 
-3 -
and unusual punishment and unnecessary rigor and is contrary to the 
fundamental principles upon which our constitution was conceived. 
Article I Section 27, Utah State Constitution. 
5. That under §76-2-305 an element of the offense is 
converted to an affirmative defense thereby relieving the State of 
the obligation to overcome the presumption of innocense and bring 
forth evidence to prove all the elements of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt in violation of Defendant's State and Federal 
Constitutional right to due process of law. In Re Winship 397 O.S. 
358 (1970) Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) 76-2-308, 
76-1-502 (2Mb). 
DATED this J) day of March, 1992. 
Vnsa ^\.(LnJ 
LISA J-/REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that the 
above-entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on 
Wednesday, the 25th day of March, 1992, at the hour of 1:30 p.m. 
before the honorable MICHAEL R. MURPHY. Please govern yourselves 
accordingly. 
DATED this b day of March, 1992. 
m^—«*„ 
LISA J. REMAL, (#2722) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
ttr.'flS 5 0^ =.' Ji 
BY '/&r» 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MIKELL SWEEZEY, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DECLARE 77-14-4 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND NOTICE 
OF HEARING 
Case No. 921900092FS 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
The Defendant, MIKELL SWEEZEY, through his attorney, 
LISA J. REMAL, hereby moves this court to find Utah Code Ann. 
77-14-4 (Supp. 1990) unconstitutional. Defendant specifically 
alleges that subsection (2) which requires that Defendant make 
himself available and fully cooperate in an examination by the Utah 
State Department of Human Services, constitutes a violation of 
Defendant's right not to be compelled to be a witness against 
himself as guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and his right not to give evidence against himself as 
guaranteed in Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution. 
See also 77-1-6 (2)(c). 
0036 
Defendant alleges that the provisions of the statute which 
provide that failure to make himself available and cooperate may 
result in a bar to presenting expert testimony relating to his 
defense of mental illness is a denial of Due Process of Law as 
guaranteed in Article I Sections 7 and 27 of the Utah State 
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution 
DATED this O day of March, 1992. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
LISA JU REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that the 
above-entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on 
Wednesday, the 25th day of March, 1992, at the hour of 1:30 p.m. 
before the Honorable MICHAEL R. MURPHY. Please govern yourselves 
accordingly. 
DATED this b day of March, 1992. 
J 
0C3~ 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW (#3768) 
MARK R. MOFFAT (#5112) 
RICHAR MADRO (#5402) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-532-5444 
AUG 1 9 1991 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
TOMAS R. HERRERA, 
Defendant 
MOTION TO DECLARE UTAH 
STATUTORY SCHEME IN REGARDS 
TO MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH 
Case 911901075FS 
The defendant, TOMAS R. HERRERA, through his attorneys, 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW, MARK R. MOFFAT and RICHARD MAURO, hereby moves 
this court to declare the statutory scheme in regards to mentally 
ill offenders unconstitutional including, but not limited to the 
following statutes: Utah Code Ann. 76-2-305, 76-5-205(2), 77-14-3, 
77-14-4 (Supp. 1990). Defendant further requests that this court 
allow him to present evidence, and that the court instruct the jury 
regarding the defenses of insanity and diminished capacity. In 
support of this motion, defendant alleges the following specific 
violations of his state and federal constitutional rights. 
1. That defendant is denied due process of law as 
guaranteed in Article I, Sections 7 and 27 of the Utah State 
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitutions in that defendant is denied the right to 
,»n0?S 
present a defense that is fundamental to our jurisprudence and was 
incorporated within the concept of due process at the time due 
process was guaranteed to all citizens by passage of the State and 
Federal Constitutions. 
2. That defendant is denied due process of law, equal 
protection of law, and uniform operation of the laws as guaranteed 
in Article I Sections 2, 7, 24 and 27 of the Utah State Constitution 
and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution in that the manner in which 76-2-305 has been applied. 
Defendant specifically alleges that application of 76-2-305, is 
inconsistent, and criminal responsibility is imposed arbitrarily and 
capriciously and without consideration to actual culpability, and 
condemns in an inconsistent manner conduct that is without fault. 
State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) (Utah 1988) Utah Code 
Ann. 76-1-104 (2)(4) (Supp. 1990) 
3. That Defendant is denied equal protection of the law, 
and uniform operation of laws as guaranteed in the Federal and 
States constitutions (Supra) in that the following statutes 
discriminate against mentally ill persons charged with crimes: 
A) Under 76-5-205(2) Defendant as a mentally ill person 
is denied the right to mitigation of the offenses charged in Counts 
I, II and III that is afforded to other persons similarly situated. 
B) Defendant as a mentally ill person is forced to 
waive his right to remain silent and not give evidence against 
himself and may be precluded from contesting an element of 
-2-
oi)027 
the offense if he chooses not to give evidence against himself. 
C) Under 76-2-305, because Defendant is a mentally ill 
person, an element of the offense is converted to an affirmative 
defense and the state may be able to prove its case with a different 
and lesser standard of proof than would be required if the Defendant 
were not mentally ill. Utah Code Ann. 76-l-502(b) (1990 Supp). 
5. That treatment of Defendant and other mentally ill 
offenders under the Utah statutory scheme constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment and unnecessary rigor in violation of Article I, 
Section 9 of the Utah State Constitution and the Eight Amendment to 
the United States Constitution in the following particulars. 
A) Failure to recognize a different standard for 
imposing responsibility when the Defendant because of mental illness 
is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, or is 
unable to conform conduct to the requirements of law, constitutes 
unnecessary rigor, and is contrary to the fundamental pricipals upon 
which our constitution was conceived. Article I section 27 Utah 
State Constitution. 
B) Failure to recognzie the need for disparate 
treatment or punishment for menally ill offenders constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment and unnecessary rigor and is contrary to the 
fundamental pricipals upon which our constitution was concieved. 
Article I Section 27, Utah State Constitution. 
6. That under 76-2-305 an element of the offense is 
converted to an affirmative defense thereby relieving the State of 
its obligation to overcome the presumption of innocense and bring 
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forth evidence to prove all the elements of the elements of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt in violation of Defendant's State 
and Federal Constitutional right to due process of law. in Re 
Winship 397 U.S. 358 (1970) Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) 
76-2-308, 76-1-502 (2)(b). 
DATED this /f ^ day of August, 1991. 
^AMES'C. BRADSHAW 
Lttoxney for Defendant 
MARK 0*rHOI 
Attorney for"Defendant 
RICHARD MAURO 
Attorney for Defendant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the 
County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
this day of August, 1991. 
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JAMES C. BRADSHAW (#3768) 
MARK R. MOFFAT (#5112) 
RICHARD MAURO (#5402) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake Cicy, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
L,2faiy C.'afK 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
TOMAS R. HERRERA, 
Defendant 
MOTION TO DECLARE 
77-14-4 UNCONSITUTIONAL 
JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH 
Case 911901075FS 
The Defendant, TOMAS R. HERRERA, through his attorneys, 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW, MARK R. MOFFAT and RICHARD MAURO, hereby moves 
this court to find Utah Code Ann. 77-14-4 (Supp. 1990) 
unconstitutional. Defendant specifically alleges that subsection 
(2) which requires that Defendant make himself available and fully 
cooperate in an examination by the Utah State Department of Human 
Services, constitutes a violation of Defendant's right not to be 
compelled to be a witness against himself and guaranteed in the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and his right not 
to give evidence against himself as guaranteed in Article I, Section 
12 of the Utah State Constitution, See also 77-1-6 (2)(c). 
Defendant alleges that the provisions of the statute which 
provide that failure to make himself available and cooperate may 
result in a bar to presenting expert testimony relating to his 
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defense of mental illness is a denial of Due Process of Law as 
guaranteed in Article I Sections 7 and 27 of the Utah State 
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. 
DATED this /'i v flay of August, 1991. 2&K 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. BRADSHAW 
Att/orney for Defendant 
(/i.'M. h. ... 
MARKER. MOFFfhW 
Attorney for Defendant 
RICHARD MAURO " 
Attorney for Defendant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the 
County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
this //<{ day of August, 1991. 
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ADDENDUM G 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
BARBARA J. BYRNE, Bar No. 3920 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
&y. 
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Deputy C a r 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MIKEIL SWEEZEY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 921900092FS 
Hon. Michael R. Murphey 
Regarding the defendant's Motion to Declare UCA 76-2-305 
Unconstitutional, based on memoranda submitted by both parties and 
oral argument heard on March 25 and 30 and on April 8, 1992, the 
Court now Orders that the defendant's motion is denied. 
The Court specifically holds that: 
1) UCA 76-2-305 is Constitutional because 
of the presumption of Constitutionality 
that attaches to legislative enactments. 
2) That although the right of the 
defendant to present a -traditional-
insanity defense may rise to the level of a 
fundamental right, UCA 76-2-305 offends 
neither the United States nor the Utah 
Constitutions as long as it is read in 
conjunction with UCA 77-16a-2, which 
provides for a verdict of guilty and 
mentally ill. 
0217 
ORDER 
Case No. 921900092FS 
Page 2 
3) That UCA 77-14-3 and 4 do not violate 
the defendant's rights against 
self-incrimination as guaranteed by the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution or Article I, 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
Dated this <JO day of April, 1992. 
Approved as to Form: 
Lisa ReWal, Esq. 
Counsel for Defendant 
u 
MICHAEL R. MURPF&, Jud§e / 
Third District Court / 
02 IS 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS (3039) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capital 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801)538-1021 
DAVID E. YOCUM 
County Attorney 
CHARLES D. BEHRENS, Jr. (5176) 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
Case No. 911901075 
TOMAS R. HERRERA, : 
JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH 
Defendant. : 
This matter came on for hearings on September 11, 1991, 
December 6, 1991, and February 3, 1992, before the Honorable John 
A. Rokich, Judge, Third District Court, on defendant's "Motion to 
Declare 77-14-4 Unconstitutional" and "Motion to Declare Utah 
Statutory Scheme in Regards to Mentally 111 Offenders 
Unconstitutional." Defendant was present and represented by 
counsel, James C. Bradshaw, Mark R. Moffat and Richard Mauro, Salt 
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Lake Legal Defenders Association. The State was represented by 
Christine F. Soltis, Assistant Utah Attorney General, Charles D. 
Behrens, Jr. and John N. Spikes, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorneys. 
Having heard the evidence presented and the arguments of the 
parties, and having reviewed and considered the memoranda 
submitted, the Court, being fully advised in the premises, enters 
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That defendant is charged with one count of Murder, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 
(Supp. 1991), and two counts of Attempted Murder, second degree 
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1991), 
which latter charges are also charged under the firearm enhanced 
penalty provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1990). 
2. That the basis of the charges is that on June 6, 
1991, defendant entered his former girlfriend's home and shot her 
twice in the head. Defendant also shot at but missed the victim's 
mother and brother. 
3. That on August 9, 1991, defendant entered a not 
guilty plea to the information. Trial was set for January 21, 
1992. 
4. That on August 19, 1991, defendant filed a document 
entitled "Notice of Intent to Contest an Element of the Offense." 
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In it, defendant stated "his intention at trial to present evidence 
including the testimony of mental health experts, to demonstrate 
that there exists a reasonable doubt as to the States [sic] 
allegation that Defendant acted intentionally and knowingly as 
charged in counts I, II and III of the information." Defendant 
then asserted that he would "not present any 'affirmative defense' 
in regards to mental state" and was therefore "not bound by the 
notice provisions of of [sic] Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 (1) (Supp. 
1990) [sic]." No memorandum or statement of facts accompanied the 
motion. 
5. That on August 19, 1991, defendant filed a document 
entitled "Motion to Declare 77-14-4 Unconstitutional" in which 
defendant claimed that the psychiatric examination mandated under 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4 (Supp. 1991) violated his federal and 
state constitutional rights to not "be a witness against himself" 
and to "not give evidence against himself." No memorandum or 
statement of facts accompanied the motion. 
6. That at the same time, defendant filed a third 
document entitled "Motion to Declare Utah Statutory Scheme in 
Regards Mentally 111 Offenders Unconstitutional," which motion 
sought to declare as unconstitutional Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 
(1990) (defining the defense of mental illness), Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-205(2)
 #(1990) (emotional disturbance manslaughter), Utah Code 
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Ann. § 77-14-3 (1990) (requiring a defendant to give notice if he 
intends to rely on the defense of mental illness or diminished 
capacity), and Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4 (mandating a psychiatric 
examination for defendants who provide notice under § 77-14-3 that 
they intend to rely on the defense of insanity) . No memorandum or 
statement of facts accompanied the motion. 
7. That the State moved to dismiss defendant's motions 
without prejudice on the basis that defendant had failed to 
establish any facts from which it might be assumed that the sanity 
of defendant would be at issue at trial. The State contended that 
before a defendant can attack the constitutionality of statutes, he 
must establish that he would be adversely affected by those 
statutes such that an actual case and controversy exists. 
8. That on September 11, 1991, the Court, as a courtesy 
to one of the defense counsel who was leaving the state, permitted 
an evidentiary hearing to be held on defendant's motions subject to 
a continuing objection by the State. 
9. That at the commencement of the hearing, both in 
chambers and in open court, the Court informed defendant that he 
must present some factual basis from which the Court could conclude 
that the defense of insanity was at issue in the case or that 
defendant was otherwise adversely affected by the statutes 
challenged.^ The Court informed defendant that the mere fact that 
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defendant was criminally charged was insufficient to provide the 
requisite procedural basis to seek what in essence was a 
declaratory judgment that specific criminal statutes were 
unconstitutional. 
10. That the Court informed counsel that any expert 
testifying during the hearing would be subject to cross-examination 
concerning the basis of his opinion as permitted under rule 705, 
Utah Rules of Evidence. The State agreed that any of defendant's 
statements concerning the crime made to the experts were subject to 
fifth amendment protections. 
11. That defense counsel then proffered, "simply for the 
standing issue," that if asked, Dr. Breck LeBegue, a qualified 
psychiatric expert, would testify that he: 
has done evaluations of Mr. Herrera; that he 
continues to evaluate him; as a result of that 
evaluation, he has concluded that Mr. Herrera, 
at the time that this offense occurred, was 
suffering from a mental illness; and further, 
that as a result of that mental illness, if 
the standard to be applied were the A.L.I, 
test of insanity, that he would find, that he 
would conclude, that Mr. Herrera was insane 
and not criminally responsible at the time of 
the offense which is before the court 
occurred. 
As to whether defendant would fit within the existing statutory-
definition of mental illness, counsel proffered that Dr. LeBegue 
was "unable to reach a definitive conclusion in regards to that 
issue at this point of time." 
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12. That defendant then called Dr. LeBegue to testify to 
other matters but refused to allow Dr. LeBegue to be questioned in 
regard to the proffer or the basis of his conclusions and opinions, 
if any, concerning defendant's sanity. 
13. That Dr. LeBegue's testimony was therefore limited 
to general observations concerning the definition and application 
of insanity in criminal trials without any reference to the facts 
of this case or defendant's mental state. Dr. LeBegue testified 
that he has performed mental evaluations in different jurisdictions 
utilizing varying definitions of mental illness. Both in Utah and 
Idaho, he has performed mental evaluations utilizing the current 
Utah-type "mens rea" definition of mental illness. In those cases, 
Dr. LeBegue was able to reach psychiatric conclusions under the 
legal definition. 
14. That Dr. LeBegue testified that under the current 
Utah definition of mental illness some delusional offenders could 
be found "not guilty by reason of insanity" while others could be 
found "guilty and mentally ill." For example, a delusional 
offender who nevertheless intended to kill a human being could be 
found "guilty and mentally ill," while a delusional offender who 
did not intend to kill a human being, i.e., thought he was 
attacking a tree, could be found "not guilty by reason of 
insanity." In Dr. LeBegue's opinion, both offenders would be 
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similar from a psychiatric point of view. Dr. LeBegue did not 
testify that defendant was delusional. 
15. That the Division of Mental Health, Utah State 
Department of Human Services, is currently in the process of 
creating a list of licensed mental health professionals throughout 
the state to perform competency and mental examinations pursuant to 
§ 77-14-4. Additionally, the Division of Mental Health is 
attempting to establish minimum procedures to be utilized in such 
examinations. Dr. LeBegue testified about his concerns regarding 
the standard fees contemplated for such examinations, the forensic 
qualifications of any examiner, and the number of examiners to be 
appointed in a given case. Dr. LeBegue testified that as long as 
two forensic examiners were appointed for purposes of determining 
sanity under § 77-14-4, the current statutory examination 
procedures would be appropriate. 
16. That at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, 
counsel for defendant represented that he would submit an affidavit 
of Dr. LeBegue to support the proffer previously made. The Court 
then ordered supportive memoranda to be submitted. 
17. That on September 16, 1991, defendant submitted a 
memorandum in support of his motions, as delineated in paragraphs 
4, 5, and 6. All the issues raised by defendant were addressed in 
defendant's memoranda and/or argued to the Court. 
7 
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18. That on October 16, 1991, the State submitted its 
memorandum in opposition to defendant's motions. The State renewed 
its motion to dismiss on the basis that defendant had not 
established that he was relying on the defense of insanity at trial 
or that he would be restricted from presenting any evidence at 
trial such that the challenged statutes adversely affected him. 
19. That on November 29, 1991, one week before the 
scheduled final argument on defendant's motions, defendant 
submitted a reply memorandum which included an affidavit of Dr. 
LeBegue. In the affidavit, Dr. LeBegue concluded that "Tomas 
Herrera was 'insane,' as that term was legally defined in Utah 
prior to 1983, at the time of the commission of the present 
offense." Continuing, Dr. LeBegue stated that in his opinion 
"legitimate issues as to Defendant's sanity at the time of the 
commission of the offense" existed but that he was "unable to state 
with certainty whether Tomas Herrera would qualify for the defense 
of insanity as presently defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 
(1991) [sic]." 
20. That additionally, defendant attached to his 
November 29, 1991, reply memorandum a statement of a lay witness 
that when defendant ingested drugs and alcohol, he became "crazy." 
21. That on December 6, 1991, during the scheduled final 
argument of defendant's motions, defendant amended his plea to 
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"guilty, or, in the alternative, not guilty by reason of insanity." 
However, defendant continued to assert that he was not subject to 
the notice or examination procedures of §§ 77-14-3 and -4. 
22. That based on the amended plea on December 6, 1991, 
the State conceded that defendant had established that defendant's 
insanity would be at issue in his trial and had, therefore, 
established his standing to challenge the facial constitutionality 
of Utah's definition of insanity as well as the examination 
procedures to which he was now subject. The State continued to 
challenge defendant's other constitutional arguments as being 
without factual context or support. The Court adopted the State's 
position. 
23. That based on the facts related in the memoranda, 
testified to by Dr. LeBegue and proffered and argued by the 
parties, the court finds solely for purposes of determining 
defendant's motions and not as a determination of defendant's 
criminal culpability, if any, that: 
(a) Defendant entered Claudia Martinez's home, shot 
her twice in the head and shot at, but missed, her mother and 
brother. 
(b) Defendant was arrested approximately fifteen to 
twenty minutes later in possession of a revolver-style handgun. 
(c) After being advised of his Miranda rights, 
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defendant admitted to the police that he decided to shoot Claudia 
and went to her home with his gun for that purpose. Specifically, 
defendant was interrogated by the police on June 6, 1991 from 3:57 
a.m. until 5:20 a.m. The interrogation was taped in part. During 
an untaped portion of the interrogation, defendant related that on 
the night of the shooting he had been visiting "some girl" and the 
"something snapped, something happened to him and he decided to go 
to the Martinez house to shoot Claudia." 
(d) Defendant's blood was drawn approximately six 
hours after the shootings. Subsequent chemical analysis did not 
reveal the presence of alcohol or drugs. 
(e) Until his amended plea of "not guilty by reason 
of insanity," defendant has consistently insisted that he was not 
relying on the defense of insanity. 
(f) Other than his amended plea, defendant has 
presented no evidence that he intends on relying on the defense of 
insanity at trial. 
(g) The proffer of Dr. LeBegue's testimony and the 
submission of his affidavit do not address the question of whether 
a controversy concerning defendant's sanity presently exists. At 
best, Dr. LeBegue's opinion is that defendant suffers from an 
undisclosed mental illness, and that under pre-1983 mental illness 
definitions, defendant could be deemed insane. Dr. LeBegue has no 
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opinion as to whether defendant is legally insane under current 
definitions. The usefulness of this opinion in determining the 
issues at bar is extremely limited in that there is no evidence of 
what category or degree of mental illness defendant suffers, the 
effect of that mental illness on the acts in question, and the 
basis from which Dr. LeBegue concludes that defendant would have 
previously qualified for a defense. Nor does the opinion set forth 
why Dr. LeBegue is unable to reach a conclusion as to defendant's 
status under current law. Due to defendant's refusal to allow any 
examination of Dr. LeBegue concerning the basis of his opinion, as 
allowable under rule 705, Utah Rules of Evidence, there is no 
evidence from which to evaluate the validity and applicability of 
the doctor's opinion to the facts of this case. 
(h) The affidavit of Reuben Martinez does not support 
that defendant's sanity will be at issue at trial. The Court finds 
that the statements are merely common generalizations of a lay 
witness and gives no credence to them. 
(g) The statements of defendant's counsel during oral 
argument on December 6, 1991, and February 3, 1992, that defendant 
is a "paranoid schizophrenic" and suffers from "hallucinations" and 
"delusions" are simply assertions of counsel without any 
evidentiary support and, therefore, are not considered by the 
Court. 
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Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Based on defendant's amended plea of not guilty by 
reason of insanity and Dr. LeBegue's affidavit that legitimate 
issues exist concerning defendant's sanity, the Court concludes 
that defendant has established that it is likely that his sanity 
will be at issue in any trial of this matter. 
2. Based on the Court's Conclusion in Paragraph 1 that 
defendant's sanity will be at issue, the Court concludes that 
defendant is subject to the notice provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 
77-14-3 and the examination provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4. 
3. The Court concludes, therefore, that defendant has 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
2-305 (defining mental illness), Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 (the 
notice provision) and Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4 (mental examination 
provision). 
4. The Court concludes, however, that defendant 
currently lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990) (manslaughter statute) or the statutory 
sentencing scheme for guilty and mentally ill offenders in that 
defendant has not established that he is subject to the challenged 
statutes. State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1989) (relying on 
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Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983)); State v. Tebbs, 786 
P.2d 775 (Utah App. 1990). Defendant is charged under the murder 
statute and has not established that he could be culpable under any 
lesser included offense. Similarly, defendant has not been 
convicted of any crime nor established any basis from which to 
assume that his mental condition, if any, would require post-
conviction treatment. Therefore, neither of defendant's claims are 
ripe for adjudication. Adelman v. Lynch, 815 P.2d 741 (Utah App. 
1991) (relying on Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake City Comm'm., 624 P.2d 
1138 (Utah 1981). 
5. The Court concludes that defendant has presented no 
basis from which to conclude that the statutory definition of 
mental illness found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 is facially 
unconstitutional. Neither the Utah nor federal constitution 
mandates a single definition of mental illness. Leland v. Oregon, 
343 U.S. 790 (1952). Compare standards enunciated in State v. 
DePlontv, 749 P.2d 621 (Utah 1987), with State v. Green, 6 P.2d 177 
(Utah 1931), and Territory v. Calton, 5 U. 451, 16 P. 902 (1888). 
Instead, it has been left to the prerogative of the states to 
define mental illness for purposes of criminal culpability based on 
evolving medical and community standards. Powell v. Texas, 392 
U.S. 514 (1968). Section 76-2-305 absolves a defendant of criminal 
responsibility when, due to mental illness or diminished capacity, 
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he lacks the requisite mental state for the crime charged. 
Defendant has failed to show any deprivation of due process under 
such a definition. 
6. The Court concludes that defendant has failed to 
present any basis from which to conclude that the statutory 
definition of mental illness found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 
relieves the State of any burden of proof. The United States 
Supreme Court has clearly rejected defendant's argument in 
concluding that due process allows a state to require that a 
criminal defendant initially raise the defense of insanity. Leland 
v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790; Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 
(1977). The Idaho Supreme Court, in ruling on a statute 
essentially identical to Utah's, has similarly ruled. State v. 
Beam, 710 P.2d 526 (Idaho 1985). Utah case law throughout this 
century has consistently found no constitutional defect in 
requiring a defendant to raise the defense of insanity. State v. 
Green, 6 P.2d 177. The Court concludes that § 76-2-305 does not 
relieve the State of its constitutional burden of proof nor imposes 
on defendant any "new" burden. 
7. The Court concludes that defendant has failed to 
present any basis from which to conclude that Utah Code Ann. § 76-
2-305 is arbitrary and capricious. While Dr. LeBegue testified 
that some delusional offenders may now be found "not guilty by 
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reason of insanity" while others may be found "guilty and mentally 
ill," defendant has failed to establish that such a distinction is 
constitutionally impermissible. The Court concludes that the legal 
standard of mental illness for purposes of criminal culpability is 
not constitutionally required to embrace all medical definitions of 
mental illness. See Conclusion No. 4, supra. See also State v. 
Green, 6 P.2d 177. Further, -he Court concludes that no evidence 
was presented that defendant is a delusional offender and, 
therefore, there is no bas.5 from which to conclude that the 
statute is arbitrary as app.ied. 
8. The Court concludes that defendant has presented no 
basis from which to conclude that the notice and examination 
procedures outlined in Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-14-3 and -4 are 
facially unconstitutional. Essentially identical provisions have 
existed in Utah since 1973. No Utah appellate court has found such 
provisions to be constitutionally defective. The Court concludes 
that these provisions embody the long-standing concept that the 
sanity of a criminal defendant will be presumed unless a defendant 
raises the issue of his alleged insanity. State v. Romero, 684 
P.2d 643 (Utah 1984) I citing State v. Green, 6 P.2d 177). Further, 
the provisions codify the procedural safeguards of a fair trial for 
all parties by requiring pretrial disclosure of expert testimony. 
Defendant has failed to show any deprivation of due process under 
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these requirements. 
9. The Court concludes that defendant has failed to 
present any basis from which to conclude that Utah Code Ann. § 77-
14-4 violates his rights against self-incrimination under either 
the federal or state constitution. The privilege against self-
incrimination prohibits the use of unconstitutionally compelled 
evidence. However, both the United States and Utah Supreme Courts 
have rejected the claim that a mental examination itself is 
unconstitutional on fifth amendment grounds. Estelle v. Smith, 451 
U.S. 454 (1981); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988). 
Instead, defendant's argument must be limited either to an 
assertion of the constitutional privilege in response to a specific 
question during the examination, or to the restriction of the 
prosecution's use at trial of defendant's compelled incriminatory 
statements. For these reasons, the Court concludes that defendant 
must submit to a mental examination pursuant to § 77-14-4. The 
report from this examination, as well as Dr. LeBegue's examination, 
will be submitted to the Court. The Court will then review the 
reports and delete or otherwise restrict the use of any 
constitutionally privileged information. 
WHEREFORE, defendant's motions are denied without 
prejudice. Defendant is ordered to submit to a mental examination 
pursuant to, § 77-14-4. Said examination shall be conducted 
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independently by two qualified forensic psychiatric examiners. At 
defendant's option, one of those examiners may be Dr. LeBegue or 
defendant may elect to retain Dr. LeBegue as a defense expert. The 
reports of any psychiatric examinations of defendant will be 
submitted to the Court for purposes of making a determination as to 
whether the reports contain constitutionally privileged materials. 
If so, the Court will mask, delete or otherwise restrict the use of 
said materials by the State during its case-in-chief. 
DATED this ^ day of 4teL®**> 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
\ HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH 
VTHixd District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MARK R. MOFFAT 
RICHARD P. MAURO 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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ADDENDUM H 
rtafls 5o?M'3 t LISA J. REMAL (#2722) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MIKELL SWEEZEY, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DR. BRECK LEBEGUE 
Case No. 921900092FS 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE ) 
Dr. Breck LeBegue, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. I am a psychiatrist licensed to practice in the State 
of Utah. 
2. I specialize in the field of forensic psychiatry and 
have extensive training and experience in the field of forensic 
psychiatry. 
3. I have previously testified as an expert in the field 
of forensic psychiatry in various courts in the State of Utah, as 
well as courts in the State of Wyoming and California. 
4. I am familiar with the various legal definitions of 
insanity, including the "M'Naughten" standard of insanity and the 
"ALI" standard of insanity. 0091 
5. I am familiar with the legal definition of insanity as 
it existed in Utah prior to 1983. I am also familiar with Utah's 
present legal definition of insanity. 
6* I have evaluated many people who have been charged with 
criminal offenses; the purpose of those evaluations has been, in 
part, to determine if those people qualified for defenses of 
insanity or diminished capacity. 
7. Of those I have evaluated, many have been mentally ill; 
the majority of the mentally ill offenders I have evaluated have 
been charged with some type of assault, or with murder. 
8. Of the mentally ill offenders I have evaluated, the 
majority of them have been diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic. 
9. Many schizophrenic offenders I have evaluated committed 
violent criminal acts because of a false perception of reality 
caused by their mental illness. 
10. The offenders I have evaluated who suffered from 
delusions fell into two distinct categories: 
A. The first category is for those mentally ill 
offenders v/hose delusions cause them to commit violent acts against 
another person, but even in their delusions they are intentionally 
or knowingly harming or killing a person, although the delusions 
distort the actual people involved, or the real situation. 
B. The second category is for those mentally ill 
offenders whose delusions also cause them to commit violent acts 
against another person, but they have the delusional belief that 
they are harming or killing something that is not human. 
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11• Neither group of offenders is more mentally ill than 
the other; both groups are equally in need of treatment; the 
delusions seem equally real for both groups of offenders; each group 
has the same inability to comprehend the wrongfulness of their acts; 
each group is equally unable to control their behavior; the threat 
of punishment will deter neither group from acting in accordance 
with their delusions. 
12. Under current Otah law, only the second category of 
mentally ill offenders qualifies for a defense of insanity, even 
though the only difference between the two groups is the content of 
their delusions which are caused by their mental illness. 
13. Under other legal definitions of insanity, including 
the "M'Naughten" standard and the "ALI" standard, some of the 
offenders from both categories would have legally qualified for the 
defense of insanity. 
14. I have been retained by the Salt Lake Legal Defender's 
Association for the purpose of performing psychological tests and 
evaluations on the defendant, Mikell Sweezey. 
15. As part of my evaluation, I have administered 
psychological tests to Mikell Sweezey. I have also interviewed him 
personally and have reviewed Defendant's medical and psychological 
records. I have also reviewed the police reports regarding his 
pending Attempted Murder charge. 
16. Based on my evaluation, I am of the opinion that 
Mikell Sweezey was suffering from a mental illness at the time of 
the commission of the present offense. 
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17. Based on my evaluations I am of the opinion that Mikell 
Sweezey would qualify for the affirmative defense of insanity as 
that defense existed in Utah prior to 1983. I am of the opinion 
that Mikell Sweezey was "insane", as that term was legally defined 
in Utah prior to 1983, at the time of the commission of the present 
offense. 
18. Based on my evaluations to date, Mikell Sweezy would not 
qualify for the defense of insanity as presently defined by Utah 
Code Ann. 76-2-305 (1991). 
19. Based on my evaluations to date I believe that there are 
legitimate issues as to Defendant's sanity at the time of the 
commission of the offense. 
Dated this day of March, 1992. 
1992 
Breck Lebegue 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s / ^ day o f March, 
NOTARY PUBLIC^ v^y / j LS 
_Residing in; 7U*M MAWltc/Ji 
My Commission E x p i r e s : I "^STSNT"""*""V""—"••"—i /J^-, 
/ • Wxr&M My Commission ExniraT I y Commission Expires I 
L « ^ " ^ SttaofUtah 
J 
MARK R. MOFFAT (5112) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
Thira cuc5cia» District 
DECJ&4 ^  
SALT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDIffIA3XPI 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Deputy CitrK 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
V. 
TOMAS HERRERA, 
Defendant 
AFFIDAVIT OF DR. BRECK 
LeBEGUE 
Case No. 911001837FS 
JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH 
) 
:ss 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Dr. Breck LeBegue, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. I am a psychiatrist licensed to practice in the State 
of Utah. 
2. I specialize in the field of forensic psychiatry and 
have extensive training and experience in the field of forensic 
psychiatry. 
3. I have previously testified as an expert in the field 
of forensic psychiatry in various courts in the State of Utah, as 
well as courts in the State of Wyoming and California. 
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4. I am familiar with the various legal definitions of 
insanity, including the "M'Naughten" standard of insanity and the 
"ALI" standard of insanity. 
5. I am familiar with the legal definition of insanity as 
it existed in Utah prior to 1983. I am also familiar with Utah's 
present legal definition of insanity. 
6. I have been retained by the Salt Lake Legal Defender's 
Association for the purpose of performing psychological tests and 
evaluations on the defendant, Tomas Herrera. 
7. As part of my evaluations, I have administered 
psychological tests to Tomas Herrera. I have also interviewed him 
personally and have reviewed Defendant's medical and psychological 
records. I have also discussed Mr. Herrera's case with his 
attorneys and have reviewed notes and memoranda they have forwarded 
to me. 
8. Based on my evaluations, I am of the opinion that Tomas 
Herrera was suffering from a mental illness at the time of the 
commission of the present offense. 
9. Based on my evaluations I am of the opinion that Tomas 
Herrera would qualify for the affirmative defense of insanity as 
that defense existed in Utah prior to 1983. I am of the opinion that 
Tomas Herrera was "insane", as that term was legally defined in Utah 
prior to 1983, at the time of the commission of the present offense. 
10. Based on my evaluations to date, I am unable to state 
with certainty whether Tomas Herrera would qualify for the defense 
of insanity as presently defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1991). 
11. Based on my evaluations to date I believe that there 
are legitimate issues as to Defendant's sanity at the time of the 
commission of the offense. 
DATED this 7*? day of Af*/ . 1 9 9 1 . 
ouDowrt 
BRECK LeBEGUE 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
1991. 
NOTARY Vb&VC 
SANDRA.I. HAflBwUN 
50 North Mfidfc?( Orlvo 
S.L.C., UT 34132 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
JULY 18,1fiB4 
*TATE OF UTAH 
My Co; 
NOTARYPUBLI 
R e s i d i n g i n 
urn ires: 
day of 
tysi/fo4,(J T/aU. 
•/ 1 / 
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